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Abstract
This study analyzes the effect of retirement on cognitive function; specifically, the
hypothesis from human capital theory that because cognitive investment increases a
worker’s wage, workers may invest in their cognitive ability more than retirees, con-
tributing to a post-retirement decline in cognitive function. While this topic is of great
interest to health economics, we show that the method of analysis of some previous
studies is not valid for examining this effect, and we propose an alternative method
that addresses this concern. Further, our estimates indicate that retirement has only a
weak effect on cognitive ability in a wide range of analyzed countries and heterogeneous
groups. Therefore, according to our analysis, policies that have been widely adopted in
developed countries to delay retirement, such as increasing the pensionable age, appear
to have little detrimental affect on post-retirement cognitive ability.
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1 Introduction
Due to rising life expectancies and declining birthrates associated with economic devel-
opment, many industrialized countries are now facing the problem of an aging population.
In 2015, there were 900 million people over 60 years of age worldwide, and this number is ex-
pected to continue to grow rapidly. As a country’s population ages, the cost of social security
and welfare increases, eroding the country’s budget, and so numerous developed countries
have introduced retirement-related policies such as pension system reform in order to reduce
the cost of social security and social welfare to a sustainable level. Pension reforms in de-
veloped countries are mostly targeted at delaying retirement, and the United States, United
Kingdom and Korea, for example, have decided to increase the age of pension eligibility,
while Japan has already done so. The relationship between social security and retirement
in developed countries has attracted a fair amount of attention in economics (Gruber and
Wise (1998)), and one of the key factors for policymakers in evaluating the effects of these
reforms is the health of retirees. An active and extended work life can be seen as beneficial
to the health of the elderly because it might lead to a reduction in the often rapid growth in
medical expenses throughout retirement.
However, longer life expectancies are associated with increased prevalence of chronic dis-
eases such as dementia. According to the 2015 World Alzheimer Report 1 , the global cost
of dementia has increased from USD 604 billion in 2010 to USD 818 billion in 2015, an in-
crease of 35.4 percent. In the US, the total monetary cost of dementia in 2010 was estimated
to be between 157 and 215 billion dollars, with about 11 billion dollars of this cost paid
by Medicare (Hurd et al. (2013)). Although the rising cost of dementia and other chronic
diseases associated with the elderly make the relationship between retirement and health of
great research and policy interest, to date, there is no consensus among the studies of the
past two decades either on the mechanism by which retirement affects health or even on the
direction of its impact. While some studies conclude that retirement has a positive impact
on either mental or physical health, others conclude that retirement has either a negative
effect or none at all. 2
Just as with the effect of retirement on health, the discussion in the literature of the
effects of retirement on cognitive function is also ambiguous. While Adam et al. (2006)
find a positive effect of occupational activities on the cognitive function of the elderly in
1See https://www.alz.co.uk/research/world-report-2015 for further details.
2 Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1997), among the first to suggest an endogeneity in decisionmaking regarding
retirement and health, find in their study of the Netherlands using the fixed effect (FE) method that the
Hopkins Symptom Checklist health index can be improved by taking early retirement. But when Lindeboom
et al. (2002), also applying an FE method to Dutch data, extend the Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1997)
study to other indices such as the Mini Mental State Examination test on cognitive ability and the CES-D
test of depressing feelings, they find different results. In another early study, Charles (2004) examines the
causal effect of retirement on health by focusing on the subjective wellbeing of retirees using an instrumental
variables (IV) approach. Since then, numerous studies have analyzed the effect of retirement on various health
indices, including Bound and Waidmann (2007), Coe and Lindeboom (2008), Dave et al. (2008), Neuman
(2008), Johnston and Lee (2009), Latif (2011), Coe and Zamarro (2011), Kajitani (2011), Behncke (2012),
Bonsang et al. (2012), Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012), Hernaes et al. (2013), Bingley and Martinello (2013),
Hashimoto (2013), Insler (2014), Kajitani et al. (2014), Hashimoto (2015), and Kajitani et al. (2016a).
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Europe and Coe et al. (2012) find a positive relationship between retirement duration and
cognitive functioning but only for blue-collar workers, other studies of Europe find either no
clear relation at all (Coe and Zamarro (2011)) or a negative effect (Mazzonna and Peracchi
(2012)) between retirement and cognitive function. Exploring the theoretical foundations
for their empirical study, Rohwedder and Willis (2010) discuss two hypotheses explaining
why retirement might cause cognitive function to decline. The first, the “unengaged lifestyle
hypothesis”, is a mental retirement effect in which cognitive decline may result from a worker
lacking cognitive stimulation after retirement. The second hypothesis, an “on-the-job” retire-
ment effect, is based on the human capital production function (Ben-Porath (1967)), which
relates inputs such as one’s current stock of human capital and investments in schooling or
on-the-job training to one’s skill output. This hypothesis posits that a worker’s incentive
to continue investing in human capital before retirement will depend on one’s expected age
of retirement, with a worker expecting to retire later having a much greater incentive to
invest human capital before retirement because of the potential economic returns (in in-
creased wages) accruing from this additional capital. When a worker retires, this incentive
is removed, and so the “on-the-job” retirement effect presumes that workers engage in more
cognitive investment behavior than retirees, leading to cognitive decline in retirement.
In their empirical analysis, Rohwedder and Willis (2010) show a negative relationship
between retirement and cognitive function, but their simple regression analysis does not
control for such important factors as age and education. In their re-examination of the
Rohwedder model, Bingley and Martinello (2013) include years of education and gender
variables and find a weaker but still negative estimated effect, implying that the results of
this model are sensitive to the specific controlled characteristics that are included. Similarly,
Kajitani et al. (2014) argue that there exists a heterogeneity in cognitive deterioration related
to the characteristics of the occupation and, further, Kajitani et al. (2016a) and Kajitani
et al. (2016b) suggest that cognitive function is negatively affected by retirement duration
and working hours.
In light of the above discussion, the goal of this study is to examine the “mental retirement
effect” to determine whether or not there exists a causal effect of retirement on cognitive func-
tion. We do this in two steps. First, we examine the validity of the cross-sectional estimation
procedure adopted in the literature and also the influence of the set of analyzed countries on
the measured effects of retirement on cognitive function. Second, using a simple econometric
model, we re-examine the mental retirement effect and the “on-the-job” retirement effect
(Rohwedder and Willis (2010)) in the U.S. and other countries. To our knowledge, this is
the first analysis that treats retirement endogenously in interpreting its effect on cognitive
ability. Additionally, we investigate several potential sources of heterogeneity, including in-
dividual characteristics and time spent on leisure activities, that are either not covered in
the literature or that are suggested as areas for future research. Finally, drawing upon the
medical literature, we also examine the effect of body mass index (BMI) and fat intake on
the heterogeneity of the effect of retirement on cognitive function.
Our estimates indicate that retirement has a weak effect on post-retirement cognitive
scores in a wide range of analyzed countries and heterogeneous groups. Additionally, in our
checks of the movement of cognitive scores around retirement age, we found no evidence that
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cognitive scores decline sharply around retirement age, or that retirement age influences how
fast one’s cognitive score declines. Therefore, our findings suggest that retirement policies in
developed countries aimed at increasing the pensionable age do not substantially influence
the cognitive abilities of the elderly.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the dataset,
section 3 discusses the wide-ranging effects of retirement on cognitive function, and section 4
examines the validity of a cross-sectional cross-country analysis. Section 5 discusses the main
results from our dynamic analysis method, and section 6 concludes the paper and discusses
the scope for future research.
2 Data
In order to conduct our analysis of the effect of retirement on cognitive ability, this study
utilizes data on health and retirement from numerous countries, including the US Health and
Retirement Study (HRS), China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), En-
glish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging (KLoSA),
Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), and Japanese Study of Age-
ing and Retirement (JSTAR). These datasets are all panel surveys of individuals aged around
50 or over, and HRS family datasets are constructed so that the questions in the HRS family
studies are as similar as possible to the original questions in the HRS. All of the datasets
include a rich variety of variables to capture dimensions of life in terms of family background
and economic, health, social and work status.
For data on cognitive ability, we used the cognitive function scores in the HRS and other
related datasets, which included immediate and delayed word recall, a word recall summary
score, serial 7s and backwards counting. The word recall test occurs in two rounds, with the
respondent asked to recall as many words as possible from a 10 word list first immediately
and then again after a given period of time. The score of the immediate and delayed word
recall test is the number of words that were recalled correctly and a word recall summary
score of between 0 and 20 is obtained from the sum of the two rounds. The serial 7s test asks
the respondent to subtract 7 from the prior number beginning with 100 for 5 trials and from
this, a score between 0 and 5 is obtained. The backwards counting test asks the respondent
to count backwards for 10 continuous numbers from 20, and the original score obtained from
this test is 2 if successful on the first try, 1 if successful on the second, and 0 if not successful
on either try. However, because of the difficulty in interpreting the estimated coefficient of the
original score, we adjusted this test score to indicate one when the respondent is successful
on the first try and 0 otherwise. For our analysis in section 3, we used only the word recall
summary score, while in sections 4 and 5, we used all types of scores.
Cognitive function scores are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, which show the descriptive
statistics of the age group from 60 to 69 in all countries and the United States, respectively.
From Table 1, we can see that cognition scores are not the same level in all countries, with
scores in China and European countries comparatively lower than those of the U.S., U.K.,
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Korea, 3 and Japan. In Table 2, we can see that females have a higher score than males
in the word recall summary score, while males have higher score than females in serial 7.
Additionally, those who are highly educated (i.e. university graduates) have a higher score
than those with lower levels of education in all cognitive scores.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Cognition Scores (Age 60 -69) around 2010
Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
HRS
Word Recall Summary Score 5057 10.33 3.23 0 20
Immediate Word Recall 5057 5.64 1.56 0 10
Delayed Word Recall 5057 4.68 1.89 0 10
Serial 7s 5057 3.53 1.65 0 5
ELSA1
Word Recall Summary Score 3593 11.17 3.32 0 20
Immediate Word Recall 3592 6.17 1.67 0 10
Delayed Word Recall 3593 5.01 1.93 0 10
SHARE2
Word Recall Summary Score 18998 9.31 3.40 0 20
Immediate Word Recall 19025 5.33 1.68 0 10
Delayed Word Recall 19019 3.97 2.03 0 10
Serial 7s 18576 3.76 1.74 0 5
JSTAR
Word Recall Summary Score 1463 10.10 3.00 0 20
Immediate Word Recall 1501 5.27 1.49 0 10
Delayed Word Recall 1471 4.80 1.85 0 10
Serial 7s 1508 4.10 1.20 0 5
CHARLS
Word Recall Summary Score 3838 6.89 3.16 0 18
Immediate Word Recall 3890 3.91 1.60 0 10
Delayed Word Recall 3856 2.95 1.87 0 10
Serial 7s 3880 3.11 1.88 0 5
KLoSA
Word Recall Summary Score3 2253 4.74 1.31 0 6
Immediate Word Recall3 2253 2.68 0.67 0 3
Delayed Word Recall3 2253 2.06 0.96 0 3
Serial 7s 2253 3.83 1.57 0 5
1 ELSA does not include Serial 7s scores.
2 Calculated using weight.
3 KLoSA’s Word Recall Scores are not comparable with other datasets.
As explained in detail in sections 4 and 5, in this study, we analyzed the effect of retire-
ment on cognitive function in two ways. First, we performed a cross-sectional, cross-country
analysis using two cohorts (2004 and 2010) of the cross sectional datasets of the HRS, ELSA,
and SHARE datasets as well as CHARLS 2011 and JSTAR 2009. We used JSTAR 2009
3For each test, the maximum test score in KLoSA is different from that of the other studies.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics: The US (Age:60-69) at 2010
Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Male Female
Word Recall Summary Score 2038 9.70 3.14 0 20 3019 10.76 3.21 0 20
Immediate Word Recall 2038 5.37 1.56 0 10 3019 5.82 1.54 0 10
Delayed Word Recall 2038 4.32 1.82 0 10 3019 4.92 1.90 0 10
Serial 7s 2038 3.76 1.55 0 5 3019 3.38 1.69 0 5
Not University Graduate University Graduate
Word Recall Summary Score 3819 9.86 3.14 0 20 1236 11.81 3.05 0 20
Immediate Word Recall 3819 5.42 1.53 0 10 1236 6.33 1.45 0 10
Delayed Word Recall 3819 4.43 1.84 0 10 1236 5.45 1.82 0 10
Serial 7s 3819 3.27 1.70 0 5 1236 4.33 1.12 0 5
White Collar Blue Collar
Word Recall Summary Score 2889 11.04 3.13 0 20 1027 9.36 3.05 1 19
Immediate Word Recall 2889 5.95 1.50 0 10 1027 5.17 1.50 1 10
Delayed Word Recall 2889 5.08 1.85 0 10 1027 4.17 1.76 0 10
Serial 7s 2889 3.80 1.51 0 5 1027 3.25 1.69 0 5
because no survey was conducted in 2010 and the word recall questions in 2011 were asked
only to people older than 65. Unfortunately, we were not able to use the Korean Longitudinal
Study of Ageing (KLoSA) for this initial analysis because the test score questions were not
comparable with other datasets.
Next, we performed a dynamic analysis of the long-term variation of retirement behavior
for certain countries for which detailed information on the age of pension eligibility was
available. When available, we used harmonized datasets, 4 but when the variables were not
available in the harmonized datasets, we used the variables of the original datasets. Table 3
describes the datasets used for the analyses reported in each section of this paper.
Also note that in this paper, following Rohwedder and Willis (2010) and Bingley and
Martinello (2013), we used pensionable age as an instrumental variable, and section 4 reports
the results of our analysis when performing the cross-sectional cross-country analysis using the
pensionable age for all countries. However, the pensionable age variable used by Rohwedder
and Willis (2010) and Bingley and Martinello (2013) were based on data from the OECD
Pensions at a Glance and the US Social Security Programs throughout the World: Europe,
2004, and these data for some countries are partly incorrect (see Appendix (A.1) for an
explanation and description of how we corrected for this). In section 5, we report the results
of our analysis using only the pensionable ages confirmed to be correct.
4 The Gateway to Global Aging Data (http://gateway.usc.edu) provides harmonized versions of data
from international aging and retirement studies (e.g., HRS, ELSA, SHARE, KLoSA, and CHARLS), with
all the variables of each dataset aiming to have the same items and follow the same naming conventions in
order to enable researchers to conduct cross-national comparative studies. The program code to generate the
harmonized datasets from the original datasets is provided by the Center for Global Ageing Research, USC
Davis School of Gerontology and the Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR). Some variables, such
as measures of assets and income, are imputed by this code.
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Table 3: Datasets Used in this Study
Wave Year
Cross Sectional Analysis (Section 4)
HRS 7,10 2004,2010
SHARE 1,4 2004,2010
ELSA 2,5 2004,2010
JSTAR 2 2009
CHARLS 1 2011
Dynamic Analysis (Section 5)
HRS 3-10 1996-2010
SHARE1 1-5 2004-2012
ELSA 1-6 2002-2014
JSTAR 1-4 2007-2013
KLoSA 1-4 2006-2012
1: Only Denmark, France and Germany are analyzed.
3 Retirement and Decline in Cognitive Function
3.1 Discussion
One of the goals of this study is to analyze heterogeneity in the effect of retirement
on cognitive function. In this section, we discuss which characteristics correlate with the
difference in cognitive scores between retirees and non-retirees, and establish that there are
factors other than basic individual characteristics such as gender and job characteristics that
correlate with this difference.
Figures 1 and 2 report the differences in the relationship of the scores for the Serial 7s
and Word Recall Summary tests of cognitive functioning between retired and non-retired in-
dividuals in Japan, the U.S., South Korea, China, Germany and France using two definitions
of retirement: “not working for pay” and “self-reported retiree”. 5 First, as the results are
similar for both definitions of retirement, the influence of the retirement definition is weak.
Next, we see that the difference in cognitive scores between retired and non-retired individ-
uals is generally extremely small in all of the analyzed countries, and while the relationship
is similar across countries, heterogeneity does exist. For example, while the serial 7s score in
the U.S. is lower for those who are retired than those not retired, the results for China are
5 “Not working for pay” indicates that a respondent is not working for wages or other type of payment,
while “self-reported retiree” means that a respondent reported his status to be retired. We constructed these
two variables from the “r@lbrf” variable reported in the RAND HRS dataset. In the HRS, “r@lbrf” takes
seven values, and in this paper, we define a respondent as a self-reported retiree if r@lbrf’ is “partly retired,”
“retired,” “disabled” or “not in labor force”. In other words, the difference between not working for pay and
self-reported retiree is whether unemployed respondents are included or excluded. Page 1033 of the Rand
HRS data codebook (http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/modules/meta/rand/randhrsm/randhrsM.pdf) explains
in detail the variable “r@lbrf” used in all the harmonized datasets in this study (e.g., Harmonized SHARE,
Harmonized ELSA), which follows numerous studies in the literature (e.g. Rohwedder and Willis (2010),
Coe and Zamarro (2011), Bonsang et al. (2012), Bingley and Martinello (2013)) that use these two similar
definitions of retirement. For example, Rohwedder and Willis (2010) consider the respondent retired if “not
working for pay”, and in Bonsang et al. (2012), a respondent is considered retired if s/he self-reports “not
working”.
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the opposite. We can thus conclude that the cognitive function scores between retired and
non-retired people have a heterogeneous relationship which depends on the specific countries
analyzed. Further, this relationship does not seem to change according to the specific cogni-
tive test used as, for example, the results for retirees and non-retirees in the U.S. and China
for the word recall summary score are the same as those for the Serial 7s test described above:
the score of retired individuals is lower than that of the non-retired in the U.S. but higher
in China. Japan is similar to China in the serial 7s score. In sum, since the demographic
profile of each country is different, it is possible that this is the source of the differences
across countries in the relationship of overall average cognitive scores between retirees and
non-retirees.
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Figure 1: Serial 7s Score by Country (All Waves)
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Figure 2: Word Recall Summary Score by Country (All Waves)
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Next, we explore the apparent differences in the characteristics of the U.S. and China
further by comparing the cognitive levels of retirees in both countries, using the two defini-
tions of retired person described above and the Serial 7s and Word Recall Summary scores
measuring cognitive functioning (Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6). We look at gender, education, job
type and wealth. 6 While we can observe in Figures 3 through 6 that there seems to be some
heterogeneity in individual characteristics between the U.S. and China, it is important to
note that any difference in cognitive scores between retirees and non-retirees in these figures
is not the effect of retirement on cognitive function since the former is endogenous. However,
we can say that unobserved heterogeneity influences the difference in cognitive score between
retirees and non-retirees among different countries. In summary:
• In each country, differences in characteristics such as gender, education and wealth ex-
plain the difference in cognitive function between retirees and non-retirees and, more-
oever, the differences between the scores are heterogeneous with respect to the specific
characteristic analyzed. We also note that the influence of retirement definition on the
difference in the cognitive scores between retirees and non-retirees is weak.
• It is possible that there exist characteristics other than gender, education, and wealth
that might contribute to observed differences in the scores between retirees and non-
retirees as, indeed, does the endogeneity of retirement. However, it is possible that
these factors strongly correlate with the country of residence for, as we have seen, in
China, the cognitive function scores (either serial 7s or word recall) of retirees are larger
than those of non-retirees for all characteristics while the relationship is the opposite in
the U.S. Nonetheless, any unobserved factors other than gender and education are im-
portant, as they could potentially be causing an observed inverse relationship between
the scores of retirees and non-retirees.
As we have discussed in this section, factors other than individual characteristics such
as gender, education, and wealth are important for explaining the difference in cognitive
function scores between retirees and non-retirees. This means that when we consider the
effect of retirement on cognitive function, we have to also consider the potential influence of
any unobserved heterogeneity on the difference in cognitive function scores. We consider this
point further in the next section through a critical review of the literature.
6 In the literature, heterogeneity such as gender or job type is important for explaining the effect of
retirement on cognitive functioning. Coe et al. (2012), for example, estimates the effect of retirement on
cognitive function for two job types (white-collar and blue-collar). In Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6, we also separated
respondents into two job categories for the U.S. using the occupation code for the job with longest reported
tenure. However, for China, we were not able to separate the job category into white-collar and blue-collar
in the same way because the information on the job category of retirees was not available. As a result, we
did not use the cognitive scores based on job types in China.
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Figure 3: Serial 7 Scores in the U.S. and China (All Waves) by Gender, Education, Occupational
Type and Wealth
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Figure 4: Serial 7 Scores in the U.S. and China (All Waves) by Gender, Education, Occupational
Type and Wealth
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Figure 5: Word Recall Summary Scores in the U.S. and China (All Waves) by Gender, Education,
Occupational Type and Wealth
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Figure 6: Word Recall Summary Scores in the U.S. and China (All Waves) by Gender, Education,
Occupational Type and Wealth
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4 Preliminary Analysis: Validation Test of Cross-Sectional
Cross-Country Analysis
In the previous section, we discussed the heterogeneity of the difference in cognitive
scores between retirees and non-retirees among different countries. In this section, we further
consider this point by determining the validity of the cross-sectional analysis in previous
studies through a critical review of the literature. We find that an estimation strategy based
on cross-sectional analysis lacks robustness in that the estimated results are sensitive to the
chosen set of countries analyzed. In other words, the specific countries chosen can unduly
influence the final results.
4.1 Identification Strategy of Cross-Sectional Cross-Country Anal-
ysis
In this section, we investigate the robustness of the estimation strategy using cross-country
variations in the age of pension eligibility. Since the goal of this research is to estimate the
effect of retirement on cognitive function, the target of our identification strategy is to exclude
any endogeneity bias that may be present in the retirement variable. Our analysis is carried
out in two stages: first, we perform a cross-sectional cross-country analysis; and, second, a
dynamic analysis of individual countries using panel data. In the first stage, the identification
strategy is to use the variation in the age of pension eligibility among different countries in
a specific year, which varies by country. We can use this exogenous variation to control for
retirement endogeneity by simultaneously analyzing different countries with different pension
eligibility ages.
Now, turning to the related literature, Rohwedder and Willis (2010), Coe and Zamarro
(2011), and Bingley and Martinello (2013) are the studies analyzing the effect of retirement on
cognitive function that are most relevant to this paper. Focusing on Rohwedder and Willis
(2010), the age of pension eligibility used in the study is based on external data sources:
the OECD Pensions at a Glance and US Social Security Administration Social Security
Programs throughout the World: Europe, 2004. However, in our review of pension age data
using primary data sources, we find that the data reported in the secondary sources used
by Rohwedder and Willis (2010) are partly incorrect. Accordingly, in our analysis, we use a
corrected version of the pension eligibility ages in Rohwedder and Willis (2010), as described
in detail in Appendix (A.1).
According to our analysis, the estimated effect of retirement on cognitive function is het-
erogeneous among different sets of analyzed countries. Therefore, it is important to analyze
this effect for each country rather than for groups of countries because it is possible that
any unobserved heterogeneity might not be fully controlled for by using a cross-sectional
cross-country analytic methodology. Consequently, in order to omit any potential individual
unobserved heterogeneity, in the second stage of our analysis, we estimate the effect of retire-
ment on cognitive function by using the dynamic variation in individual retirement behavior.
Before moving to a description of our second-stage dynamic analysis, in the next section we
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describe the first-stage framework by which we came to our critical conclusion about the
validity of the cross-sectional cross-country methodology used in most other studies.
4.2 Analysis Framework
For the first stage of our analysis, we update Rohwedder and Willis (2010) and Bingley
and Martinello (2013) using a corrected dataset and adding a robust set of control variables.
To begin, note that Rohwedder and Willis (2010) estimate the model below, using HRS,
SHARE, and ELSA data for 2004 and restricting the analyzed sample to ages 60-64:
cognition scorei = β0 + β1notworki + 1i (1)
notworki = α0 + α11{agei ≥ Aebi }+ α21{agei ≥ Afbi }+ 2i
Aebi : age of eligibility for early retirement benefit
Afbi : age of eligibility for full retirement benefit
where notworki is an indicator equal to one when a respondent is not working for pay in the
survey year, cognition scorei is the word recall summary score (range: 0-20) and agei is the
respondent’s age. Note that the model does not include any control variables.
Bingley and Martinello (2013), following Rohwedder and Willis (2010), also estimate
Equation (1), but include an education (years of schooling) control variable. In our spec-
ification, we also include other control variables in addition to educational level, including
gender, education and wealth. We also check the sensitivity of our results according to the
control variables included. Our estimation specification, considering observed respondent
heterogeneity, is shown in Equation 2:
cognition scorei = β0 + β1notworki + γ
′xi + 1i (2)
notworki = α0 + α11{agei ≥ Aebi }+ α21{agei ≥ Afbi }+ η′xi + 2i
Aebi : age of eligibility for early retirement benefit
Afbi : age of eligibility for full retirement benefit
where xi is a set of individual characteristics that we incorporate as control variables. These
characteristics are unobserved in Equation (1) and so potentially could have produced the es-
timated differences in cognitive function among retirees. These characteristics could also have
been correlated with the retirement variable, thus introducing bias into the estimated effect
of retirement on health. Further, Rohwedder and Willis (2010) and Bingley and Martinello
(2013) do not use any estimation weights for cross-country analysis in their estimations and
also do not adjust the estimation according to population size. In our analysis, we incorporate
an estimation weight based on UN data. 7
7See the website http://data.un.org/Default.aspx for more detail on the UN A World of Information data.
Our methodology for calculating the estimation weights are described in Appendix A.4.
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With respect to control variables, it is rather difficult to assess which variables should be
included in the estimation model, as the literature is wide-ranging and ambiguous. The pub-
lic health literature discusses the relationship between behavioral factors (physical activity,
lifestyle habits and leisure time activity) and cognitive function (Dik et al. (2003), Scarmeas
and Stern (2003), Wilson et al. (2003), Nyberg et al. (2012), Raji et al. (2016), Satizabal
et al. (2016)), and McEwen and Sapolsky (1995) and Sindi et al. (2016) indicate a relationship
between stress and cognitive function. Additionally, Nyberg et al. (2000) suggest that gender
differences influence cognitive function, and Satizabal et al. (2016) find that the incidence
of dementia has declined over the last three decades, but cannot find a factor that explains
this phenomenon. There are also numerous studies that discuss the relationship between
social factors and cognitive function. After considering all of the possible control variables
discussed in the literature, in our study, we included demographic factors such as gender,
family structure, economic variables, and country of residence in the estimation model to
control for fundamental social determinants of human behavior. In section 5, we also use a
simple economic model to discuss how social factors influence cognitive function.
To summarize the analysis of this section, we find the following conclusions:
• We find a significant effect of changing the sample set of countries analyzed, which
suggests that the effects of retirement on cognitive function are also heterogeneous
among different groups even if the analyzed groups have similar ages.
• We have shown that the effect of control variables for individual heterogeneity cannot
be ignored. However, in our cross-country cross-sectional analysis specification, we
found that the magnitude of the effect of retirement on cognitive function was similar
to the magnitude estimated in some of related literature (Rohwedder and Willis (2010),
Bingley and Martinello (2013)) even though we included control variables for individual
heterogeneity while the other studies did not.
• Including a corrected instrumental variable influences the final results substantially
when we compare our results to the instrumental variable estimates of Rohwedder and
Willis (2010) and Bingley and Martinello (2013), showing that the effect of correcting
the IV is not weak.
Finally, before we turn to our results, we note that the claims in Rohwedder and Willis
(2010) of a negative relationship between average cognitive score and percent eligible for early
public pension benefits may be overextended. In our Figure 7 below, we have used 2010 data
to replicate and update Figure 6 in Rohwedder and Willis (2010) (pp. 134-135), which
is based on a 2004 dataset. Like Rohwedder and Willis (2010), we also find an apparent
negative relationship between average cognitive score and percent eligible for early public
pension benefits, but this relationship may not be robust and, in any case, it may be only a
correlation rather than a causal relationship.
The next section reports the main results of our stage 1 cross-sectional cross-country
analysis. Secondary results are reported in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 7: Replication of Rohwedder & Willis 2010 (Early Retirement)
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Figure 8: Replication of Rohwedder & Willis 2010 (Full Retirement)
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4.3 Results: Importance of the Set of Countries Analyzed
In this section, we focus on the importance of the choice of countries analyzed. Table 4
reports the results of our estimates of equations (1) and (2) for four groups of countries based
on linguistic regions: Latin (France, Spain Portugal, and Italy), Slavic (Estonia, Slovenia,
Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic), Germanic (U.K., Netherlands, Germany, Denmark,
Belgium, Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland), and New SHARE and East Asia (Japan, China,
Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia, and Estonia). We also include Original
without Greece, which is the original set of countries analyzed by Rohwedder and Willis
(2010), minus Greece, as it was not included in the 2010 survey. Since many countries
have been included in the HRS sister surveys since 2002, for this analysis, we used the 2010
dataset.8 Further, in order to accomodate the variation in the age of pension eligibility in
as many countries as possible, for this analysis, we chose an age range of 60-69. Table 4
presents only the main results, omitting the coefficients of the country dummies and other
control variables. For details of our specification of pensionable ages and estimation weights,
see sections A.1) and A.4 of the Appendix.
From Table 4, we can see a large degree of heterogeneity in the estimated results. The
coefficients for some country groups are negative and significant (Original without Greece:
-0.608 (OLS); -3.940 (IV2) although the DWH test is not rejected; Germanic: -0.333 (OLS),
and Latin: -0.362 (OLS)) while the New SHARE and East Asia coefficients are significant
and positive (0.413 (OLS)) and those of Slavic are not significant (-0.138 (OLS)).
To summarize the results of our preliminary analysis:
• The choice of countries analyzed largely influences the estimated result. Therefore, we
need to pay attention to country heterogeneity when we analyze the effect of retirement
on cognitive function (Table 4);
• When important control variables are omitted, unobserved heterogeneity has a large
influence on the estimated result (Tables 22 and 24);
• The definition of retirement does not have a large influence on the estimated results9,
even though the specific definition chosen does occasionally drive different conclusions
(Table 27);
• Other factors such as differences in age or cohort do not seem to be important (Tables
26 and 27).
The implications of this finding that country heterogeneity largely influences the estimated
results poses two problems for an identification strategy in a cross-sectional cross-country
analysis:
• If the country heterogeneity of a given variable is large, even when endogeneity bias is
small, the policy implications for an individual country may not be transparent;
8JSTAR data is 2009, and CHARLS is 2011.
9Kajitani et al. (2013) also report that the sensitivity of the definition of retirement definition is weak.
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• If the bias created by unobserved variables that are correlated with the retirement
dependent variable differs among countries, then this cannot be eliminated through a
common set of control variables in a cross-sectional cross-country analysis. If this is
the case, it is difficult to estimate the effect of retirement on cognitive function because
we cannot isolate how the estimated parameter is influenced by bias for each country.
Based on this deficiency of cross-sectional cross-country analysis, we have chosen to an-
alyze the effect of retirement on cognitive function in a single country through a dynamic
model that also controls for unobserved individual heterogeneity. In the next section, we
describe our dynamic strategy for estimating the effect of retirement on cognitive function in
several countries individually, choosing only countries for which the age of pension eligibility
is confirmed to be correct (see Appendix A.1 for a full discussion). We also analyze the influ-
ence of heterogeneity of transition behavior (leisure activity) before and after retirement and
the influence of individual heterogeneity. We end with a discussion of the validity of cross-
country cross-sectional analysis based on a comparison of our findings using that approach
versus dynamic analysis.
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Table 4: Effect of Choice of Countries Analyzed (Sample Aged 60-69)
Latin Slavic Germanic
New SHARE Original
All countries
/East Asia /witout Greece
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2
Panel A: without controls
1st stage
1{age ≥ PAE} 0.235*** 0.051*** 0.060*** 0.474*** 0.136*** 0.328***
(0.062) (0.014) (0.018) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008)
1{age ≥ PAN} 0.167*** 0.243*** 0.328*** 0.123*** 0.221*** 0.120***
(0.014) (0.028) (0.020) (0.021) (0.010) (0.008)
2nd stage
Not working for pay -0.823*** -2.396*** -0.449** 0.119 -0.661*** -1.116*** 0.833*** 1.247*** -1.153*** -2.463*** 0.531*** 3.728***
(0.159) (0.621) (0.220) (0.839) (0.137) (0.412) (0.104) (0.225) (0.069) (0.245) (0.071) (0.210)
Observations 3620 3620 6086 6086 8802 8802 10315 10315 16746 16746 27061 27061
DWH p-value 0.006 0.251 0.409 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: with controls
1st stage
1{age ≥ PAE} 0.079 -0.020 0.013 0.091*** 0.002 0.052***
(0.063) (0.026) (0.048) (0.024) (0.020) (0.017)
1{age ≥ PAN} 0.037* 0.108*** 0.091*** 0.118*** 0.052*** 0.091***
(0.020) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.015) (0.014)
2nd stage
Not working for pay -0.362** -1.613 -0.138 2.917 -0.333** -0.867 0.411*** 2.793* -0.608*** -3.940* -0.030 -0.081
(0.159) (3.594) (0.231) (2.513) (0.151) (2.147) (0.110) (1.585) (0.072) (2.336) (0.072) (0.958)
Observations 3620 3620 6086 6086 8802 8802 10315 10315 16746 16746 27061 27061
DWH p-value 0.752 0.204 0.801 0.558 0.146 0.960
1 Standard errors in parentheses, * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), *** (p < .01).
2 “Latin” shows the estimated results including countries such as France, Spain Portugal, and Italy. “Slavic” includes only European countries: Estonia, Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, and Czech
Republic. “Germanic” includes European countries as well: the U.K., the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland. “New SHARE/East Asia” includes
Japan, China, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia, and Estonia. “Original without Greece” includes the countries in the “original” set(the set of analyzed countries used by
Rohwedder and Willis (2010)) without Greece.
3 All specifications are estimated with the sampling weight to adjust the population size of each country.
4 In Panel B, we also include the demographic variables (age, age squared, female dummy, the dummy which takes one if university graduate or more, marriage dummy, number of children),
economic variables (household income, house ownership, total wealth), the country dummy variables, and the interaction term of the economic variables and the country dummy variables (e.g.,
wealth× country(j)).
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5 Dynamic Analysis
Our analysis in the previous section identified two potential problems with the cross-
country cross-sectional estimation strategy used in the previous literature (Rohwedder and
Willis (2010), Coe and Zamarro (2011), and Bingley and Martinello (2013)) in estimating
the effect of retirement on cognitive function. As such, in this section we describe another
identification strategy to omit any potential unobserved heterogeneity of individual charac-
teristics. Before we proceed to the estimation, we discuss the source of heterogeneity in the
effect of retirement on cognitive function. In the related literature, Rohwedder and Willis
(2010) suggests that it is possible that a difference in activity during leisure time influences
cognitive function after retirement, raising this as a topic for future work. Bonsang et al.
(2012) also suggest that increased social interaction may be an important factor enhancing
cognitive reserve. In the next section, we introduce a simple framework to consider these
points.
5.1 The Source of Heterogeneity in the Effect of Retirement on
Cognitive Function: A Simple Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we investigate the hypothetical mechanism causing differences in cognitive
function scores between retirees and non-retirees, using a simple economic model based on
Grossman (1972). Rohwedder and Willis (2010) present a similar idea about the mechanism
by which cognitive function decreases after retirement, and our interpretations of the mental
retirement effect and the on-the-job retirement effect are drawn from this model. Mazzonna
and Peracchi (2012) model the effect of retirement on cognitive function as well, but in
their specification, retirement is exogenous and there is no asset accumulation. Further,
the utility function is formulated from cognitive investment. However, in our specification,
we formalize the utility function with cognitive ability because it is a health asset that is
increased through cognitive investment. To our knowledge, ours is the first analysis of this
model to treat retirement as an endogenous variable.
Equation (3) is a simple dynamic model with two cognitive abilities, and represents the
maximization problem of an elderly person:
max
{ct,lt,ifWt,ijWt,ifLt,ijLt}Tt=50
T∑
t=50
βt−50u(ct, l˜t, a
f
t , a
j
t)
(50 ≤ t ≤ T )
s.t. At+1 = (1 + r)At + P (lt, R, Pensiont) + yt − ct −G(ifWt, ijWt, ifLt, ijLt)
aft = Af (t, i
f
Wt, i
f
Lt, Xft)
ajt = Aj(t, i
j
Wt, i
j
Lt, Xjt)
l˜t = lt − L(ifLt, ijLt)
yt = y(a
f
t , a
j
t , t, lt) (3)
24
lt ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}
(1− lt) · imMaxWt ≥ imWt ≥ 0 (m = f, j)
ct ≥ 0, l˜t ≥ 0, imnt ≥ 0(m = f, j)(n = W,L), At+1 ≥ 0
(4)
where ct is consumption, l˜t is final consumption of leisure time, a
f
t is fundamental cognitive
ability, ajt is job specific cognitive ability, lt is leisure time, At is assets, R is pensionable age
and Pensiont is pension payment. Cognitive investment at work and leisure are included
through four variables: fundamental cognitive investment at workplace (ifWt), fundamental
cognitive investment during leisure time (ifLt), job specific cognitive investment at workplace
(ijWt), and job specific cognitive investment during leisure time (i
j
Lt). Xft and Xjt represent
technological factors of fundamental and job specific cognitive ability, and Af (·) and Aj(·)
are the production functions of fundamental and job specific cognitive ability. Finally, P (·),
G(·), L(·) and y(·) are functions for pension payment, cost of cognitive investment, reduced
time by cognitive investment, and income, and imMaxWt (m = f, j) are the maximum values of
cognitive investment during work time.
We assume that “fundamental cognitive ability”, which is the target of our analysis, is
a basic cognitive ability such as calculation, reading, or memorization while “job specific
cognitive ability” is the cognitive ability required for a specific job, such as a computing skill.
The following are the important structures of model (3):
• The elderly can undertake cognitive investment at the workplace only when they work,
and the maximum amount of this investment depends on leisure((1 − lt) · imMaxWt ≥
imWt ≥ 0(m = f, j)). When the elderly enjoy their leisure time, they can invest in their
cognitive ability, but these investments reduce (l˜t = lt−L(ifLt, ijLt)) the final amount of
leisure consumed, l˜t.
• We assume that, for the elderly, y(aft+1 = α1, ajt+1 = α2, t + 1, lt+1 = α3) − y(aft =
α1, a
j
t = α2, t, lt = α3) < 0, or that aging lowers income. Although the elderly may
continue to input the same level of leisure time and have the same level of cognitive
ability, income continues to decrease during aging. This is an effect of health on income
in that aging reduces the incentive to work.
• We assume that the elderly do not receive a pension if they are younger than pensionable
age (i.e. P (lt, R, Pensiont) = 0 if t ≤ R). Also, because of the liquidity constraint
(At ≥ 0), the incentive to work increases when the age of pension eligibility, R, increases.
• We also assume that it is possible that the elderly have a preference for either fundamen-
tal or job-specific cognitive ability, so that it is possible that
∂u(ct,l˜t,a
f
t ,a
j
t )
∂amt
> 0(m = f, j).
This structure creates an incentive to invest in the cognitive ability which is an impor-
tant property. Additionally, it creates two potential benefits for workers (income and
the opportunity to invest in one’s cognitive abilities at the workplace) because, in our
model, the elderly can perform cognitive investment at the workplace only when they
25
work. Finally, elderly who have a preference for cognitive ability have the incentive to
invest in their cognitive abilities during leisure time, which also provides an incentive
for these elderly to invest in their cognitive abilities even after retirement.
• The marginal utility of investing in one’s cognitive ability is ∂u(ct,l˜t,aft ,ajt )
∂amt
∂amt
∂imnt
(m =
f, j)(n = W,L). In other words, the factors of the cognitive ability production func-
tions Af (·) and Aj(·) are important for deciding the amount of investment when they
influence the marginal productivity of the production function(
∂amt
∂imnt
(m = f, j)).
In order to discuss the theoretical mechanism more concretely, we parameterize model (3),
with the specification presented here one example among many possibilities. The details of
the parameterization are explained in Appendix (A.3). In what follows, we discuss only the
hypothesis of why the effect of retirement on cognitive ability differs. Our parameterization
of the utility, pension payment, and cognitive ability functions are as follows:
• u(ct, l˜t, aft, ajt) = cγ1t l˜γ2t aγ3fta1−γ1−γ2−γ3jt
• P (lt, R, Pensiont) = 1{lt ≥ 0.5}1{t ≥ R}Pensiont
• Am(t, imWt, imLt, Xmt) = α1imWt+α2imLt+α3Hetro1+α4Hetro2+Am0 exp(−α5t)(m = f, j)
In our benchmark model, we set the parameters to γ3 = 0.0, 1 − γ1 − γ2 − γ3 = 0, R =
70, α5 = 0.05 and simulated the economic behavior of 5,000 agents after solving the dynamic
programming. Subsequently, initial assets A0 and initial cognitive abilities Am0(m = f, j)
were drawn from a distribution, and the influence of the average value of Am0 of the initial
distribution is presented in Figures 9-12 below. In all figures, the vertical axis indicates the
average value of each variable for all agents, and the horizontal axis represents age, beginning
at age 50. Our main findings of this analysis are summarized below:
• Influence of different preferences for fundamental cognitive ability
¯
: Figure 9 shows the
effect of a change in the parameter for fundamental cognitive ability in the retiree’s
utility function. γ3 = 0.0 in our benchmark model is changed to γ3 = 0.2 in the “with
preference” case. In the “with preference” case, when elderly start to retire around age
70, this is accompanied by a steep increase in fundamental cognitive investment during
leisure time, but this does not occur in the “without preference” case. This difference
in cognitive investment behavior occurs because in the “without preference” case, the
incentive to increase leisure is large, and so this group of elderly retires earlier, decreases
its investment in fundamental cognitive ability at the workplace, and also does not
increase it during leisure after retirement. We can see, then, that the effect of retirement
on cognitive function is due to different cognitive investment behaviors during leisure
time and at the workplace both before and after retirement. The change in cognitive
function after retirement that is caused by a change in cognitive investment behaviour,
or lifestyle, is known as the “mental retirement effect” (Rohwedder and Willis (2010)).
From the lower right panel of Figure 9, we see a great divergence in fundamental
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cognitive investment after retirement (age 72) due to heterogeneity in preferences for
cognitive ability. This heterogeneity in preferences, in turn, causes heterogeneity in the
mental retirement effect.
• Influence of different initial cognitive ability level
¯
: Figure 10 shows the effect of a change
in the average value of Am0 in the initial distribution to a lower average value in the
“high initial ability” case as compared to the benchmark. We see that this change pro-
duces no difference in cognitive investment behavior either before or after retirement.
This indicates that it is not heterogeneity in initial cognitive ability but differences in
cognitive investment behavior based on differences in preferences that creates hetero-
geneous effects of retirement on cognitive function.
• Influence of different technology in cognitive ability production function
¯
: Figure 11 shows
the effect of changing the α5 parameter from 0.05 in the benchmark case to 0.025 in the
high tech case. The decrease in cognitive function by the increase in age becomes lower
when α5 = 0.025 compared to α5 = 0.05. We find that higher technology raises fun-
damental cognitive ability and fundamental cognitive investment in the workplace, but
lowers leisure time and has no effect on leisure time fundamental cognitive investment.
Overall, the source of heterogeneity in the effect of retirement on cognitive function is
clear because the difference in cognitive investment behavior is large.
• Influence of the age of pension eligibility on investment activity
¯
: In Figure 12, we see
that a lowering of the age of pension eligibility from 70 to 65 causes the steep jump in
average leisure time to occur 5 years earlier, at the age of retirement, as expected, but
cognitive investment behavior at the workplace also sharply decreases at the pensionable
age. Thus, retirement behavior is strongly influenced by whether an elderly person has
arrived at their pensionable age or not. We can therefore use pensionable age as an
instrumental variable to control for the endogeneity of cognitive investment behaviors,
and we do incorporate this into our empirical estimation strategy described in the next
section. Additionally, in the upper right panel of Figure 12, we see that a change in the
age of pension eligibility causes heterogeneity in the age of retirement and, further, that
the change in the age of pension eligibility also causes heterogeneity in fundamental
cognitive investment at the workplace (upper left panel). This is Rohwedder and Willis
(2010)’s “on-the-job” retirement effect.
Thus far in this section, we have discussed our simulation of various sources of heterogene-
ity on the effect of retirement on cognitive investment behavior before and after retirement
both at the workplace and during leisure time. We close this section by relating this analy-
sis to the public health literature. Numerous public health studies have focused on various
determinants of cognitive function such as lifestyle habits or on the relationship between
cognitive ability and human behaviors including physical activity or lifestyle habits such as
leisure time activity (Dik et al. (2003), Scarmeas and Stern (2003), Wilson et al. (2003),
Nyberg et al. (2012), Raji et al. (2016), Satizabal et al. (2016)) and find a heterogeneous
effect on cognitive function due to varied cognitive investment behaviors during leisure time.
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Figure 9: Influence of Different Preferences for Fundamental Cognitive Ability (With or Without)
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Drawing on this public health literature, we consider the effect of this heterogeneity in leisure
time activities in the empirical section below.
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Figure 10: Influence of Different Initial Cognitive Ability Level (High or Low)
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Figure 11: Influence of Different Technology in Cognitive Ability Production Function (High or
Low)
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Figure 12: Influence of the Pension Eligibility Age (70 or 65)
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5.2 Estimation Strategy
In section 5.3, we use the dynamic variation of retirement behavior on cognitive func-
tion. Then, we analyze the effect of whether or not a respondent retires on cognitive
functioning. Figure 13 shows the target of our analysis, and we perform this analysis for the
U.S., England, France, Germany, Denmark, Korea and Japan – countries for which data on
the age of pension eligibility is available and has been confirmed to be correct.
In Figure 14 we can see that there are two retirement stages in all of the countries studied.
Between the ages of 50 to 70, many people begin retiring within a relatively short period of
time, as seen by the steep slope of the retirement curves during this period in all countries.
By age 70 to 80, however, almost all elderly have retired, and the slope of the retirement
curve is quite flat. Most of the elderly in this latter group have been retired for some time.
For our investigation, though, we analyze the effect on retirees who have recently retired, or
those retirees characterized by the steep slope of the retirement curve as demarcated by the
vertical lines in Figure (14).
Figure 13: The Target of our Analysis
Age	
Working	
Not	Working	
Retirement	
(Target)	Section	5.3:	
Retirement	Analysis	
Cognitive	Function	
Our empirical analysis is based on investigating the three sources of heterogeneity dis-
cussed in section 5.1 above that can produce differences in leisure time cognitive investment
behaviors: cognitive ability preferences, initial cognitive ability, and technological factors in
the cognitive ability production function. For our empirical analysis, we considered hetero-
geneity in the initial cognitive score (initial cognitive ability), activities during leisure time,
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Figure 14: Proportion of Retired Elderly By Age and Country
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and individual characteristics (e.g. gender, which is a technological factor of the cognitive
ability production function). Our data on the time consumed in leisure activities both before
and after retirement are from the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) admin-
istered by HRS, which describes activity patterns and “how specific types of activities are
affected by health, family, and economic transitions in later life and, in turn, how activities
affect health and well-being.” 10 Our analysis did not uncover heterogeneity in preferences
for cognitive ability but we did observe differences in initial cognitive ability and some tech-
nological factors during the transition in leisure time activity before and after retirement.
Next, we separated the sample depending on the heterogeneity of observable characteristics,
which allowed us to control for the direct effect by controlling the heterogeneity of cognitive
investment behaviors. However, some characteristics we used to separate the sample (e.g.,
BMI) are difficult to interpret, as we could not determine which factor (preference, initial
cognitive ability, technology) BMI describes. This is a limitation of the analysis.
5.3 Retirement Analysis
5.3.1 Analysis Framework
As discussed in section 4, the effect of retirement on cognition differs substantially among
countries, and so our strategy is to analyze the effect on each country individually instead of in
a cross-sectional, cross-country analysis. The countries analyzed include the U.S., England,
France, Germany, Denmark, Korea, and Japan because correct information on the age of
pension eligibility and a sufficient number of dataset waves for dynamic analysis are available.
The identification strategy in this section is to use the variation of whether a respondent
arrives at the pension eligibility age to analyze the effect of whether a respondent retires
on cognitive function. We derive the following equation from the fundamental cognitive
ability equation in model (3):
aft = Af (t, i
f
Wt, i
f
Lt, Xft) = α0 + α1i
f
Wt + α2i
f
Lt + γ
′Xft + ft (5)
Now, let aft = cognition scoreit + ˜1t, α1iWt + α2iLt = βretireit + ˜2t, cognition scoreit is
cognitive test scores, and retireit is an indicator of whether a respondent i retires in period
t. In other words, in this specification, cognitive score is a proxy of cognitive ability and
retirement status is a proxy of investment activity in enhancing cognitive ability. Substituting
the above into equation (5), we obtain the following:
cognition scoreit = α0 + βretireit + γ
′Xft + ft − ˜1t + ˜2t.
Our estimation equations are the following:
10For further details, see https://ssl.isr.umich.edu/hrs/filedownload2.php?d=522.
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cognition scoreit = β0 + β1retireit + γ
′xit + a1i + λ1t + 1it (6)
retireit = α0 + α11{ageit ≥ Aebi }+ α21{ageit ≥ Afbi }
+α11{ageit ≥ Aebi }ageit + α21{ageit ≥ Afbi }ageit + η′xit + a2i + λ2t + 2i (7)
(8)
where Aebi and A
fb
i are the ages of eligibility for early and full retirement benefits, retireit is
an indicator equal to one when a respondent retires at period t, λ1t and λ2t are time fixed
effects, a1i and a2i are individual fixed effects, and xit are control variables at period t. As
discussed in section 4.2., it is difficult to determine which specific control variables should be
included in the estimation model. We included demographic factors such as gender, family
structure, and economic variables in the estimation model to control for the fundamental
social factors that influence human behavior.
There are two common ways of defining whether a respondent is retired. The first defini-
tion of retirement is based on the person’s self-reported retirement status, with a respondent
being retired when the “self-reported retiree” variable is equal to one. This is the definition
of “self-reported retiree” based on the “r@lbrf” variable described in footnote 5 of section
3.1, and is used in several studies (e.g. Coe et al. (2012) and Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012)).
The second definition of retirement, which is most commonly used in the literature11 is that
a respondent is retired when he or she no longer works for pay.
Our definition of retirement, which we call “complete retirement”, is the intersection of
both of these common definitions; that is, a person is completely retired when he or she
is both a self-reported retiree and is no longer working for pay. This takes care of some
problems with both of the former definitions. Specifically, if a person self reports as retired,
it is still possible that the person might be doing incidental work for pay and so might be
continuing to invest in his cognitive abilities, while those who are not working for pay may
be unemployed rather than retired and so may also be investing more than a retiree would.
In order to capture the heterogeneous transition pattern of cognitive investment during
leisure both before and after retirement, we chose an age range for this analysis of 50-79 for
respondents in all countries except Japan, where we chose 50+ because it is not unusual for
people to still work even at age 80 (Figure 14). Finally, we chose for our analysis sample only
those who were not “completely retired” at least once in this analysis, because we wanted to
omit the respondents who both had not worked for pay and who had retired at an early age
for this analysis of retirement transition.
All analyzed countries survey social activities, which we used to obtain information about
each respondent’s transition before and after retirement. However, in the U.S., the Consump-
tion and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) provides detailed information on the amount of time
spent doing specific activities (Table 5). Although most activities show a clear difference be-
fore and after retirement, hours of watching TV shows the largest change. Computer use is
11For example, Rohwedder and Willis (2010), Coe and Zamarro (2011), Bonsang et al. (2012), Bingley and
Martinello (2013), Hashimoto (2013) and Hashimoto (2015).
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another activity distinctly affected by retirement, as the elderly who still work use computers
in their office. As such, we focus on the heterogeneity of of time spent watching TV and
engaged in other social activities before and after retirement in the U.S.
Additionally, some studies (Eskelinen et al. (2008) and Devore et al. (2009)) report that
there is a relationship between fat intake and cognitive function, and so we also considered
variations in the Body Mass Index (BMI) and the amount of fat intake. For this, we obtained
data from the 2013 dataset of the Health Care and Nutrition Study. Since that survey year
is different from our analysis year, the amount of fat intake in 2013 is a proxy for the amount
of fat intake in other years. In addition to the relationship between fat intake and cognitive
function, it is also possible that the amount of fat intake during the lifetime of the respondent
forms a technological factor of cognitive decline, while BMI is also a proxy for a potential
technological factor of cognitive decline. These two heterogeneities considered in this study
are not analyzed in extant studies and so are a contribution of this paper.
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Table 5: Time Spent on Various Activities Before and After Retirement (Hours)
(1) (2) (3)
Activities Not retired Retired (2)-(1)
Working for pay 3.9 0.1 -3.8
Using the computer 1.7 0.6 -1.1
Watching TV 2.5 3.4 0.9
Walking 1.1 0.8 -0.3
Attending social activities 2 2.2 0.2
Reading newspapers 0.6 0.8 0.2
Listening to music 1.1 0.9 -0.2
House cleaning 0.6 0.8 0.2
Preparing meals and cleaning-up afterwards 0.8 1 0.2
Sleeping and napping 6.7 6.6 -0.1
Visiting in-person with friends 1 1.1 0.1
Washing, ironing, or mending clothes 0.3 0.4 0.1
Yard work or gardening 0.3 0.4 0.1
Playing cards or games, or solving puzzles 0.1 0.2 0.1
Reading books 0.5 0.6 0.1
Praying or meditating 0.5 0.6 0.1
Shopping or running errands 0.5 0.6 0.1
Physically showing affection 0.5 0.4 -0.1
Treating or managing an existing medical condition 0.2 0.3 0.1
Participating in sports 0.3 0.3 0
Communicating by phone, letters, e-mail 0.8 0.8 0
Personal grooming 1 1 0
Caring for pets 0.4 0.4 0
Helping friends 0.2 0.2 0
Doing volunteer work 0.1 0.1 0
Attending religious services 0.1 0.1 0
Attending meetings of clubs or religious groups 0.1 0.1 0
Taking care of finances or investments 0.1 0.1 0
Attending concerts, movies 0 0 0
Singing or playing a musical instrument 0 0 0
Doing arts and crafts projects 0.1 0.1 0
Doing home improvements 0.1 0.1 0
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5.3.2 Results: The US and Other Countries
In this section, we first discuss the results obtained for the U.S. and then compare these
results with those from other countries. Table 6 shows the results for the U.S., and we can
see that our instruments are valid, with all of the coefficients significantly different from
zero. Tables 7, 8 and 9 show the results of the effect of retirement on cognitive function in
various groups. In Table 7, we report individual characteristics representing heterogeneity in
the technology of the cognitive ability production function: Gender (male/female), Education
(low/high), and Occupation (blue collar/white collar). Table 8 relates cognition to the health
measures of Body Mass Index (whether BMI > 25 in the 2013 survey or not) and fat intake
(whether it is more than the median in the 2013 survey or not). As discussed in section 5.2,
these characteristics were added to incorporate the relation between cognition and health
found in the health economics literature, although it is not clear what these characteristics
describe. Table 9 reports the influence of heterogeneity in initial cognitive ability (initial
scores at 1st interview) and in differences in preference for cognitive ability as seen in changes
in social activities (i.e. whether social activity decreases or increases after retirement), and
having a spouse at 1st interview (which is also an indicator of leisure time activity).
In general, we found that the effect of retirement on cognitive scores was weak even
though we did find evidence of variation in cognition scores among heterogeneous groups.
These results from Tables 7, 8 and 9 can be summarized as follows:
• The effect of retirement on the Word Recall Summary score is negative for both males
and females, but the magnitude is small (WR Summary scores in columns 1 and 2 of
Table 7 show males = -0.137 and females = -0.164). The effect of retirement on Serial 7s
score is negative only for females, and the magnitude is also small. Among occupations,
the negative effect of retirement is stronger for white collar than blue collar workers
(columns 5 and 6). We also see a negative effect of retirement on cognition for most
groups in both the Immediate and Delayed Word Recall, though the magnitude is small
and shows little variation.
• The negative effect of retirement on cognition is stronger for those with higher BMI
and fat intake (columns 1-4, Table 8).
• While the related literature suggests that heterogeneity in post-retirement activities,
particularly social activities, is important, our results (Table 9) show no evidence of
that. For example, there is no evidence that the cognitive score is influenced by either
differences in initial cognitive scores (columns 1 and 2) or a change in social activities
after retirement (columns 3 and 4). We did find, however, a stronger negative effect of
retirement on cognition for retirees with no spouse (columns 5 and 6).
Next, we compare the results from the U.S. to those of other countries, and discuss whether
any systematic difference can be found due to the heterogeneity of activity after retirement
and individual characteristics. We also analyze the effect of retirement on cognitive scores
in countries other than the U.S. to see if similar effects can be found within a given group
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in numerous countries. Here we report only the main results. For a detailed description, see
Appendix A.5.
• As in the U.S., the effect of retirement on cognitive scores according to gender is weak
in many countries (Figure 15);
• Like the U.S., there is no evidence in other countries that the cognitive score decline is
heterogeneous according to changes in social activities after retirement (Table 37);
• There is also no systematic heterogeneity of the effect of retirement on cognitive scores
in countries other than the U.S. among those having or not having a spouse at 1st
interview, BMI above or below 25, and high or low fat intake (Tables 38, 39, 40 and
41).
To sum up, the effect of retirement on cognitive scores is weak in all countries, including
the U.S., and the heterogeneity of individual characteristics and activity after retirement
analyzed in this paper was found to be not important. In the next section, we discuss
another characteristic which we found explains the heterogeneity of the effect of retirement
on cognitive scores.
5.3.3 Retirement Timing
Although we did not find that the heterogeneity of individual characteristics was impor-
tant, we did find evidence that retirement timing may cause the systematic heterogeneity of
the effect of retirement on cognitive scores. For this analysis, we chose only elderly in the
U.S. and divided the respondents aged 58-69 into two groups. Table 10 shows a negative
effect of retirement on the cognitive scores only of the older female group aged 64-69, though
the magnitude is small. Figure 16 shows the relationship between the coefficient of the fixed
effect model and the average retirement age in each country. We estimated the fixed effect
model by using the original sample of those aged 50-79 in each country, and according to Fig-
ure 16, there is an negative correlation between the magnitude of the estimated coefficients
and the average retirement age in the sample.
Finally, Figure 17 shows the relationship between average cognitive scores and age among
three groups of retirees in each country (early, mid, and late retirement), which is summarized
as the following:
• Retirement does not have a strong effect on the cognitive score, as there is no large
change around the retirement age in any of the three retirement groups. In addition,
the timing of retirement does not seem to influence how fast cognitive scores decline.
• While in the U.S., cognitive scores decrease sharply as the respondents become older,
the effect is less pronounced in other countries.
• In the U.S., the initial cognitive score of people who retire late is higher than for other
groups. This is consistent with Rohwedder and Willis (2010)’s ”on-the-job” retirement
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effect, as it is possible that those who retire late try to increase their cognitive function
before retirement in order to delay their retirement.
In summary, although our analysis found that the effect of retirement on cognitive scores
(Rohwedder and Willis (2010)’s “mental retirement effect) was weak in many countries, in
the U.S. at least, it is possible that the ”on-the-job” retirement effect (Rohwedder and Willis
(2010)) might exist. If cognitive function sharply declines as one ages, this could provide a
strong incentive to increase one’s cognitive ability before retirement for those who want to
work at a relatively advanced age.
5.3.4 Discussion: Cross-Country Cross-Sectional Analysis and Dynamic Anal-
ysis
In this section, we discuss the validity of the cross-sectional analysis adopted in the litera-
ture versus the dynamic analysis of this paper. After controlling for individual characteristics,
we found a negative effect of retirement on word recall score in all countries, although the
magnitude of the effect was small, with the estimated effect of the US being -0.154 (Ta-
ble 28). The estimated results without controls found, however, some problematic results,
such as a coefficient of “All countries” of 3.728 (column 12 of Table 4). The results were
not problematic for all country groups, however, for specifications for country groups with
controls. For example, the coefficients of “Latin”, “Slavic” and “Germanic” were -0.362
(OLS), -0.138 (not significant)(OLS) and -0.333 (OLS); small in magnitude and negative.
It thus seems that cross-country cross-sectional analysis may be unduly affected by strong
relationships within individual countries. Such problems as those discussed in section 4.3 can
be avoided through a dynamic analysis.
Table 6: Effect of Pension Eligibility Age on Full Retirement
US
(1) (2) (3)
Full Male Female
1{age ≥ Aeb} 0.078*** 0.094*** 0.065***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
1{age ≥ Afb} 1.103*** 1.025*** 1.188***
(0.216) (0.319) (0.293)
1{age ≥ Afb} × age -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 86773 38848 47925
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), ***
(p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , mar-
riage dummy, number of children), economic variables (house-
hold income, house ownership, total wealth), region dummies,
year dummies, 1st survey dummy, and 2nd-4th survey dummy
(only HRS).
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Table 7: Heterogeneity of Observable Characteristics 1
Gender Education Occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male Female Low High
Blue White
collar collar
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.137*** -0.164*** -0.149*** -0.158*** -0.083 -0.169***
(0.040) (0.036) (0.030) (0.058) (0.055) (0.034)
Observations 38848 47925 65323 21433 19404 53512
DWH p-val 0.179 0.134 0.397 0.425 0.340 0.301
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.058*** -0.064*** -0.053*** -0.088*** -0.054* -0.405**
(0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.030) (0.028) (0.203)
Observations 38848 47925 65323 21433 19404 53512
DWH p-val 0.306 0.948 0.852 0.131 0.530 0.097
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE-IV
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.081*** 0.451* -0.098*** -0.070** -0.029 -0.104***
(0.024) (0.252) (0.019) (0.035) (0.033) (0.021)
Observations 38848 47925 65323 21433 19404 53512
DWH p-val 0.175 0.023 0.236 0.931 0.314 0.715
Model FE FE-IV FE FE FE FE
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.008 -0.415** -0.321** -0.039* -0.048** -0.338**
(0.016) (0.183) (0.141) (0.022) (0.024) (0.168)
Observations 38848 47925 65323 21433 19404 53512
DWH p-val 0.937 0.040 0.035 0.761 0.674 0.058
Model FE FE-IV FE-IV FE FE FE-IV
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.121** -0.003 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.055) (0.005) (0.002)
Observations 38848 47925 65323 21433 19404 53512
DWH p-val 0.167 0.552 0.505 0.019 0.675 0.262
Model FE FE FE FE-IV FE FE
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), *** (p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , marriage dummy, number of children), economic
variables (household income, house ownership, total wealth), region dummies, year dummies, 1st survey
dummy, and 2nd-4th survey dummy (only HRS).
41
Table 8: Heterogeneity of Observable Characteristics 2
Body Mass Index Fat intake
(1) (2) (3) (4)
< 25 ≥ 25 < Median ≥Median
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.066 -0.191*** -0.077 -0.119*
(0.049) (0.033) (0.064) (0.064)
Observations 26866 59286 15217 15187
DWH p-val 0.769 0.724 0.466 0.717
Model FE FE FE FE
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.025 -0.076*** -0.026 -0.063**
(0.024) (0.016) (0.031) (0.032)
Observations 26866 59286 15217 15187
DWH p-val 0.283 0.975 0.886 0.946
Model FE FE FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.044 -0.115*** -0.052 -0.062
(0.030) (0.020) (0.040) (0.040)
Observations 26866 59286 15217 15187
DWH p-val 0.173 0.619 0.189 0.511
Model FE FE FE FE
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.034 -0.026* -0.588* -0.823***
(0.021) (0.014) (0.303) (0.274)
Observations 26866 59286 15217 15187
DWH p-val 0.156 0.304 0.065 0.002
Model FE FE FE-IV FE-IV
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.004 -0.000 0.007 0.010*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 26866 59286 15217 15187
DWH p-val 0.158 0.322 0.153 0.875
Model FE FE FE FE
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), *** (p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , marriage dummy,
number of children), economic variables (household income, house ownership,
total wealth), region dummies, year dummies, 1st survey dummy, and 2nd-4th
survey dummy (only HRS).
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Table 9: Heterogeneity in Initial Score and Change in Leisure Activities
Initial scores
Change in Having spouse
social attendance at 1st interview
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
< Median ≥Median Not increase Increase No Yes
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.238*** -0.179*** 0.030 -0.165 -0.217*** -0.134***
(0.053) (0.043) (0.120) (0.110) (0.059) (0.030)
Observations 21704 36127 4384 4523 20053 66720
DWH p-val 0.790 0.229 0.193 0.978 0.912 0.492
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.671* -0.090*** 0.058 -0.046 -0.103*** -0.049***
(0.349) (0.020) (0.061) (0.058) (0.029) (0.015)
Observations 17879 39952 4384 4523 20053 66720
DWH p-val 0.087 0.266 0.134 0.257 0.407 0.884
Model FE-IV FE FE FE FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.137*** -0.097*** -0.013 -0.119* -0.113*** -0.087***
(0.035) (0.025) (0.068) (0.066) (0.036) (0.018)
Observations 19011 38820 4384 4523 20053 66720
DWH p-val 0.989 0.388 0.453 0.362 0.630 0.240
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.080*** -0.410* -0.028 0.012 -0.050** -0.023*
(0.028) (0.216) (0.053) (0.047) (0.025) (0.013)
Observations 19034 38797 4384 4523 20053 66720
DWH p-val 0.603 0.052 0.520 0.901 0.115 0.155
Model FE FE-IV FE FE FE FE
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.003 -0.016* -0.002 0.050**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.024)
Observations 4384 4523 20053 66720
DWH p-val 0.414 0.200 0.992 0.031
Model FE FE FE FE-IV
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), *** (p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , marriage dummy, number of children), economic
variables (household income, house ownership, total wealth), region dummies, year dummies, 1st survey
dummy, and 2nd-4th survey dummy (only HRS).
43
Figure 15: Effect of Retirement on Cognitive Score in Other Countries
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1 Plots indicate the estimated coefficient and bars for the 95% level confidence intervals.
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Table 10: Effect of Retirement on Cognitive Function by Age Group
Age 58-63 Age 64-69
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Female Male Female
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.106 0.055 -0.096 -0.268***
(0.095) (0.081) (0.092) (0.093)
Observations 11263 16596 10892 14951
DWH p-val 0.479 0.382 0.444 0.537
Model FE FE FE FE
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.039 0.032 -0.039 -0.117**
(0.049) (0.041) (0.049) (0.046)
Observations 11263 16596 10892 14951
DWH p-val 0.438 0.405 0.743 0.720
Model FE FE FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.067 0.024 -0.057 -0.147***
(0.058) (0.050) (0.055) (0.057)
Observations 11263 16596 10892 14951
DWH p-val 0.612 0.460 0.347 0.192
Model FE FE FE FE
Serial 7s
Completely retired 0.070* -3.546 -3.213 -0.018
(0.040) (2.749) (2.028) (0.041)
Observations 11263 16596 10892 14951
DWH p-val 0.194 0.078 0.024 0.460
Model FE FE-IV FE-IV FE
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.743
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.607)
Observations 11263 16596 10892 14951
DWH p-val 0.859 0.773 0.778 0.078
Model FE FE FE FE-IV
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), *** (p < .01).
2 All specifications include age and age squared.
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Figure 16: Coefficients of the Fixed Effects (FE) Model by Country
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Figure 17: Cognitive Score and Age by Retirement Age
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6 Conclusion
This study estimated the effect of retirement on cognition. The main findings of the paper
are:
• In our analysis of the validity of cross-sectional cross-country analysis, we found that
the robustness of the results is weak because the estimated results are sensitive to the
heterogeneity of the set of analyzed countries. In particular, the effect of retirement on
cognitive function within a subset of the analyzed countries can unduly influence the
final conclusion.
• In our analysis of the relationship between retirement and cognition, we found that:
– the “mental retirement effect” (Rohwedder and Willis (2010)) is weak in many
countries;
– individual characteristics such as job category, educational level and social activity
after retirement are not important in producing the heterogeneity of the effect of
retirement on cognitive scores;
– there is evidence to suggest that this effect may be produced instead by the timing
of retirement.
Comparing our results to those of related studies (Table 11), we found the effect of retirement
on cognitive ability to be weak in all countries. When we observed the scores of cognitive
ability tests before and after retirement around retirement age in the U.S., the U.K. and
SHARE countries, there was no clear decline in scores on tests of cognition before and after
retirement. This suggests that government policies within these countries to delay retirement
through such measures as increasing the age of pension eligibility might not greatly influence
the cognitive ability of the elderly after retirement. We did find, however, that BMI and
fat intake were important determinants of the effect of retirement on cognitive function
heterogeneity in the US. Additionally, our results suggest that in the U.S. in particular, it
is possible that there is an “on-the-job” retirement effect (Rohwedder and Willis (2010))
whereby those who retire at an advanced age might try to increase their cognitive function
before retirement in order to delay their retirement. Further analysis of this point remains
important future work.
We also found that engaging in social activities may not be an adequate proxy for cognitive
investment behaviors, and that elderly do not substantially change their leisure activities
before and after retirement. This leaves us with the important question as to what kind of
activity might constitute a cognitive investment behavior. Additionally, in this study, we
were only able to analyze groups and countries where we could find correct and available
data on the age of pension eleigibility in order to use it as an instrumental variable. Another
instrumental variable would potentially allow us to expand our analysis.
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A Appendix
A.1 Age of Pension Eligibility
This section explains our construction of the data for the age of pension eligibility. In our
replication of Rohwedder and Willis (2010), we expanded the number of countries, updated
the data from 2004 in the original to 2010 (the most recent available), and attempted to obtain
data directly from each source. Rohwedder and Willis (2010) obtain their data on the age
of pension eligibility from two sources12: the OECD Pensions at a Glance and the US Social
Security Administration’s Social Security Programs throughout the World: Europe, 2004. For
our analysis, we obtained information from the Bureau of Labor Statistics in each country,
either through their official website or through direct contact with the country’s Bureau of
Labor Statistics or Bureau of Statistics. If data were not available through these methods,
we obtained the most recent information for each country from the OECD Pensions at a
Glance, International Social Security Association’s Social Security Programs Throughout The
World (Europe, Asia and the Pacific, and the Americas) and the EU Mutual Information
System in Social Protection. Despite our efforts to obtain data for as many countries as
possible, detailed information about the age of pension eligibility was not available for many
countries, and so these are excluded from our analysis. Correct and detailed pension eligibility
age data was obtained for the U.S., England, Germany, France, Denmark, Switzerland, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Japan, China, and Korea, and this data is summarized in the tables below,
indicating the section of the paper in which it is used.
12See the online Appendix by Rohwedder and Willis (2010) for details.
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Table 12: Pensionable Age in Section 4
2004 2010
R & W (2010) MNO(2015) MNO(2015)
Early Full Early Full Early Full
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
R & W original countries
US 62 62 65 65 62 62 65 65 62 62 66 66
UK 65 60 65 60 ∗1 ∗1 65 60 ∗1 ∗1 65 60
Austria 61 56 65 60 61+6m 56+6m 65 60 62 57+6m 65 60
Germany 60 60 65 65 60 60 65 65 63 60 65 65
Sweden 61 61 65 65 61 61 65 65 61 61 65 65
Netherlands 60 60 65 65 ∗1 ∗1 65 65 ∗1 ∗1 65 65
Spain 60 60 65 65 61 61 65 65 61 61 65 65
Italy 57 57 65 60 57 57 65 60 59 57 65 60
France 60 60 60 60 60 60 65 65 60 60 65 65
Denmark 60 60 65 65 60 60 65 65 60 60 65+6m 65+6m
Greece 60 55 62 57 55 55 65 60 60 60 65 65
Switzerland 63 62 65 63 63 61 65 63 63 62 65 64
Belgium 60 60 65 63 60 60 65 63 60 60 65 65
Other Western countries
Czechia 60 ∗1 62+2m ∗2
Poland 60 55 65 60
Ireland ∗1 ∗1 65 65
Hungary 60 60 62 62
Portugal 55 55 65 65
Slovenia 58 58 61 63
Estonia 60 58 63 61
Luxemberg 60 60 65 65
East Asian countries
Japan 60 60 64 62
China ∗3 ∗3 60 ∗3 55 ∗3
∗1: No early retirement.
∗2: Different among the number of children. 61(No child), 59y8m(1 child) 58+4m(2 children) , 57(3 or 4 children) , 55+8m(more than 5 children)
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Table 13: Pension eligibility age in Section 5
Table 14: PEA: US
Birth cohort PEA
Early PEA
62y0m
Normal PEA
˜ 1937.12 65y0m
1938.1 ˜ 1938.12 65y2m
1939.1 ˜ 1939.12 65y4m
1940.1 ˜ 1940.12 65y6m
1941.1 ˜ 1941.12 65y8m
1942.1 ˜ 1942.12 65y10m
1943.1 ˜ 1943.12 66y0m
1944.1 ˜ 1944.12 66y0m
1945.1 ˜ 1945.12 66y0m
1946.1 ˜ 1946.12 66y0m
1947.1 ˜ 1947.12 66y0m
1948.1 ˜ 1948.12 66y0m
1949.1 ˜ 1949.12 66y0m
1950.1 ˜ 1950.12 66y0m
1951.1 ˜ 1951.12 66y0m
1952.1 ˜ 1952.12 66y0m
1953.1 ˜ 1953.12 66y0m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.12 66y0m
1955.1 ˜ 1955.12 66y2m
1956.1 ˜ 1956.12 66y4m
1957.1 ˜ 1957.12 66y6m
1958.1 ˜ 1958.12 66y8m
1959.1 ˜ 1959.12 66y10m
1960.1 ˜ 1960.12 67y0m
Table 15: PEA: UK
Birth cohort PEA
Normal PEA: Male
˜ 1953.12 65y0m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.12 66y0m
1955.1 ˜ 1959.12 66y0m
1960.1 ˜ 1960.12 67y0m
1961.1 ˜ 67y0m
Normal PEA: Female
˜ 1949.12 60y0m
1950.1 ˜ 1950.12 61y0m
1951.1 ˜ 1951.12 62y0m
1952.1 ˜ 1952.12 63y0m
1953.1 ˜ 65y0m
Table 16: PEA: Germany
Birth cohort PEA
Early PEA: Male
˜ 1952.12 63y0m
1953.1 ˜ 1953.12 63y2m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.12 63y4m
1955.1 ˜ 1955.12 63y6m
1956.1 ˜ 1956.12 63y8m
1957.1 ˜ 1957.12 63y10m
1958.1 ˜ 1958.12 64y0m
1959.1 ˜ 1959.12 64y2m
1960.1 ˜ 1960.12 64y4m
1961.1 ˜ 1961.12 64y6m
1962.1 ˜ 1962.12 64y8m
1963.1 ˜ 1963.12 64y10m
1964.1 ˜ 1964.12 65y0m
Early PEA: Female
˜ 1951.12 60y0m
Normal PEA
˜ 1946.12 65y0m
1947.1 ˜ 1947.12 65y1m
1948.1 ˜ 1948.12 65y2m
1949.1 ˜ 1949.12 65y3m
1950.1 ˜ 1950.12 65y4m
1951.1 ˜ 1951.12 65y5m
1952.1 ˜ 1952.12 65y6m
1953.1 ˜ 1953.12 65y7m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.12 65y8m
1955.1 ˜ 1955.12 65y9m
1956.1 ˜ 1956.12 65y10m
1957.1 ˜ 1957.12 65y11m
1958.1 ˜ 1958.12 66y0m
1959.1 ˜ 1959.12 66y2m
1960.1 ˜ 1960.12 66y4m
1961.1 ˜ 1961.12 66y6m
1962.1 ˜ 1962.12 66y8m
1963.1 ˜ 1963.12 66y10m
1964.1 ˜ 1964.12 67y0m
Table 17: PEA: France
Birth cohort PEA
Early PEA
˜ 1951.6 60y0m
1951.7 ˜ 1951.12 60y4m
1952.1 ˜ 1952.12 60y9m
1953.1 ˜ 1953.12 61y2m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.12 61y7m
1955.1 ˜ 1955.12 62y0m
1956.1 ˜ . 62y0m
Normal PEA
˜ 1951.6 65y0m
1951.7 ˜ 1951.12 65y4m
1952.1 ˜ 1952.12 65y9m
1953.1 ˜ 1953.12 66y2m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.12 66y7m
1955.1 ˜ 1955.12 67y0m
1956.1 ˜ . 67y0m
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Table 18: Pension eligibility age in Section 5
Table 19: PEA: Denmark
Birth cohort PEA
Early PEA
˜ 1953.12 60y0m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.6 60y6m
1954.7 ˜ 1954.12 61y0m
1955.1 ˜ 1955.6 61y6m
1955.7 ˜ 1955.12 62y0m
1956.1 ˜ 1956.6 62y6m
1956.7 ˜ 1958.12 63y0m
1959.1 ˜ 1959.6 63y6m
1959.7 ˜ 1964.6 64y0m
1964.7 ˜ 64y0m
Normal PEA
˜ 1953.12 65y0m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.6 65y6m
1954.7 ˜ 1954.12 66y0m
1955.1 ˜ 1955.6 66y6m
1955.7 ˜ 1955.12 67y0m
1956.1 ˜ 1956.6 67y0m
1956.7 ˜ 1958.12 67y0m
1959.1 ˜ 1959.6 67y0m
1959.7 ˜ 1964.6 67y0m
1964.7 ˜ 67y0m
Table 20: PEA: Japan
Birth cohort PEA
Normal PEA: Male
˜1941.4.1 60y0m
1941.4.2˜1943.4.1 61y0m
1943.4.2˜1945.4.1 62y0m
1945.4.2˜1947.4.1 63y0m
1947.4.2˜1949.4.1 64y0m
1949.4.2˜1953.4.1 65y0m
1953.4.2˜1955.4.1 65y0m
1955.4.2˜1957.4.1 65y0m
1957.4.2˜1959.4.1 65y0m
1959.4.2˜1961.4.1 65y0m
1961.4.2˜ 65y0m
Normal PEA: Female
˜1932.4.1 55y0m
1932.4.2˜1934.4.1 56y0m
1934.4.2˜1936.4.1 57y0m
1936.4.2˜1937.4.1 58y0m
1937.4.2˜1938.4.1 58y0m
1938.4.2˜1940.4.1 59y0m
1940.4.2˜1946.4.1 60y0m
1946.4.2˜1948.4.1 61y0m
1948.4.2˜1950.4.1 62y0m
1950.4.2˜1952.4.1 63y0m
1952.4.2˜1954.4.1 64y0m
1954.4.2˜1958.4.1 65y0m
1958.4.2˜1960.4.1 65y0m
1960.4.2˜1962.4.1 65y0m
1962.4.2˜1964.4.1 65y0m
1964.4.2˜1965.4.1 65y0m
1965.4.2˜ 65y0m
Table 21: PEA: Korea
Birth cohort PEA
Early PEA
˜ 1952.12 55y0m
1953.1 ˜ 1956.12 56y0m
1957.1 ˜ 1960.12 57y0m
1961.1 ˜ 1964.12 58y0m
1965.1 ˜ 1968.12 59y0m
1969.1 ˜ . 60y0m
Normal PEA
˜ 1952.12 60y0m
1953.1 ˜ 1956.12 61y0m
1957.1 ˜ 1960.12 62y0m
1961.1 ˜ 1964.12 63y0m
1965.1 ˜ 1968.12 64y0m
1969.1 ˜ . 65y0m
A.2 Results of the Preliminary Analysis: Cross-Sectional Cross-
Country Analysis
In this section, we describe the results of sensitivity analyses of previous studies that are
not discussed in section 4. Here, we check the sensitivity of the estimated results of previous
studies on the following points:
• Correcting the instrumental variables used in previous studies;
• Including control variables into the analysis of the previous studies;
• Using estimation weights which the previous studies did not use.
First, we restricted the sample to those aged 60-64, following Rohwedder and Willis (2010)
and Bingley and Martinello (2013) and then we examined the effect of including other control
variables and changing the instrumental variable (Table 22). We estimated the results using
ordinary least squares (OLS) when the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test was not rejected
in the specification using IV, and when the DWH test was rejected, we supported the result
of the specification using IV. The IV1 columns represent the results of our analysis when we
used the same IV as Rohwedder and Willis (2010) and Bingley and Martinello (2013). The
IV2 columns show the results when we substituted our IV, which we have confirmed to be
correct.
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Columns 1 and 3 in Table 22 present the results of the Rohwedder and Willis (2010) and
Bingley and Martinello (2013) specifications 13 , and column 2 shows the results of the Bingley
and Martinello (2013) specification when only the variable indicating university enrolment
was changed. In the results reported in columns 2 and 3, we also verified the effect of the
different definition of education level on the estimated coefficients.
Columns 4-7 report our estimates when we added basic individual characteristics variables
not included in Rohwedder and Willis (2010) and Bingley and Martinello (2013). Column 4
controls for age effect, column 5 adds country dummies into column 2, and columns 6 and 7
add the other individual characteristics control variables into column 5. The results of our
three sensitivity analyses listed above and shown in Table 22 can be summarized as follows:
• Correcting the IV
¯
: Changing the instrumental variable has an increasingly large effect
when control variables for individual characteristics are also added. While there is only
a small difference in the estimated effect of retirement on cognitive function between
IV1 (Rohwedder and Willis (2010)) and IV2, which corrects the IV but does not include
control variables, columns 6 and 7, which also include control variable for individual
characteristics, show a large difference in the effect of retirement on cognitive func-
tion between specifications IV1 and IV2. This indicates that the estimated effect of
retirement on cognitive function is influenced by the control variables included.
• Including Other Control Variables
¯
: The inclusion of country dummy variables causes a
large change in the magnitude of coefficients, with the coefficients of column 2 signifi-
cantly larger in magnitude than column 5. Additionally, the direction of the coefficients
is negative in column 6, and the absolute value of the coefficient for the OLS result in
column 7 is very small (-0.455) compared to the coefficient for IV2 in column 2 (IV2=
-6.538). This shows that the omitted variable bias is significant in column 2. In sum,
the results reported in Table 22 thus suggest that one’s country is a significant contrib-
utor to the observed heterogeneity of the effect of retirement on cognitive function. For
example, in column 7, the coefficients for Spain (OLS: -2.230) and Italy (OLS: -1.243)
are negative, while the coefficient of the U.S. (OLS: 2.082) is positive.
• Including Estimation Weight
¯
: From Table 24, we can see that the effect of using esti-
mation weights (see Appendix (A.4 for an explanation of our calculation methodology)
is not insignificant. By including estimation weights, the influence of the U.S. and
the U.K. increased because of their relatively large population size among the ana-
lyzed countries, and this increased the magnitude of the estimated negative effect of
retirement on cognitive function.
Next, we discuss the weighted estimation results reported in Table 24 and comment on
the difference in the definition of education level. Column 3 of Table 24 shows our estimated
coefficiants using the same specification as Bingley and Martinello (2013)14, and we can see
13 Bingley and Martinello (2013) impute the value of the years of schooling in the ELSA, but as we do not
impute this value, the ELSA sample is omitted from our estimates reported in column 3.
14See the specification “All” in Table 3 of Bingley and Martinello (2013).
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that the effect of omitting the ELSA and weighting estimation is significant, for we obtained
coefficients of -5.011 (IV1) and -5.138 (IV2), compared to -3.014 reported in Bingley and
Martinello (2013). Recall also that while we omitted ELSA data from our analysis because
data on education was not available.15, Bingley and Martinello (2013) included ELSA by
imputing years of schooling, and thus it seems that the difference in included countries may
also be important.
Next, we report the results of our estimates using the most recent data available, and find
that the estimated coefficients for 2010 and 2004 are almost the same, indicating that the
effect of retirement on cognitive function remained strong in 2010, as it was in 2004. Table 26
shows the estimated results for the two different cohorts (people aged 60-69 in 2004 and again
in 2010) using the same column 7 as reported in Table 24. Greece is omitted from the 2010
analysis because the country was not included in the 2010 SHARE data, but otherwise, the
set of countries analyzed remained the same for the two cohorts. From Table 26, we can see
that the effect of changing the year cohort is weak. The DWH tests in both columns “2004”
and “2010” are rejected (IV2), but the OLS results are almost the same (2004: -0.468; 2010:
-0.694) after controlling for the heterogeneity of the analyzed countries, and the coefficients
of the other control variables for the 2004 and 2010 OLS estimates are also similar. We can
thus conclude that the effect of retirement on cognitive function was strong both in 2004 and
in 2010.
15In our harmonized data set of analyzed countries which in Tables 22 and 24 we call the “original” set,
we included a dummy variable indicating people with education above college degree, using a code provided
by the Gateway to Global Aging Data (http://gateway.usc.edu), a project of the USC Center for Economic
and Social Research (CESR) and funded by the US National Institute on Aging.
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Finally, Table 27 shows the effect of changing the surveyed age-group and the definition of
retirement. As the results are similar to those of column 7 reported in Table 24, we find that
the effects of these changes are not significant. The estimates in the “not working” columns
are for retirement defined as “not working for pay”, “SR retirement” columns for retirement
defined as “respondent reports a retired status” (the same definition as “self-reported retiree”
as described in footnote 5 of section 3), and “complete retirement” for retirement defined as
both “not working for pay” and “respondent reports a retired status.”
Table 27: The effect of the difference in the definition of retirement and the surveyed age-
group using weight
Retired (Self-reported) Not Working for Pay Completely retired
2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010
OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2
Age group: 60-64
1st Stage Result
IV-Early-bi 0.037 0.062∗∗ 0.003 0.022 0.010 0.032
(0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025)
IV-Normal-bi 0.107∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗ -0.003 0.073∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
2nd Stage Result
retirement -0.274∗∗∗ -0.216 -0.393∗∗∗ 1.239 -0.439∗∗∗ -1.415 -0.583∗∗∗ 14.847 -0.398∗∗∗ -0.702 -0.530∗∗∗ 3.577
(0.092) (1.401) (0.107) (1.547) (0.088) (3.615) (0.110) (19.854) (0.089) (2.147) (0.108) (4.303)
Observations 8078 8078 9239 9239 8095 8095 9299 9299 8076 8076 9213 9213
R2 0.171 0.171 0.104 0.064 0.172 0.155 0.105 -3.669 0.172 0.171 0.106 -0.170
DWHchi2 0.008 1.051 0.077 2.926 0.018 1.106
DWHpval 0.930 0.305 0.781 0.087 0.892 0.293
Age group: 60-69
1st Stage Result
IV-Early-bi 0.070∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.029 0.022 0.027 0.028
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
IV-Normal-bi 0.123∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
2nd Stage Result
retirement -0.275∗∗∗ 0.777 -0.319∗∗∗ 0.411 -0.451∗∗∗ 1.527 -0.480∗∗∗ 1.241 -0.422∗∗∗ 1.167 -0.443∗∗∗ 0.490
(0.074) (0.704) (0.087) (0.720) (0.067) (1.328) (0.081) (1.849) (0.067) (1.033) (0.081) (1.263)
Observations 15830 15830 16858 16858 15852 15852 16945 16945 15827 15827 16823 16823
R2 0.168 0.155 0.111 0.105 0.170 0.113 0.112 0.070 0.170 0.132 0.113 0.100
DWHchi2 2.264 0.890 2.383 0.631 2.477 0.390
DWHpval 0.132 0.345 0.123 0.427 0.116 0.532
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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A.3 Parameterization: Model of Retirement and Cognitive Func-
tion Decline
In this section, we provide a detailed explanation of our parameterization of model (3). We
have explained the utility function, pension payments, and cognitive production functions
in section 5. The cost function of cognitive investment, the function of reduced time by
cognitive investment, and the function of income are parameterized as follows:
• G(ifWt, ijWt, ijLt, ijLt) = βWf ifWt + βWjijWt + βLf ifLt + βLjijLt
• L(ifLt, ijLt) = αf ifLt + αjijLt
• y(aft, ajt, t, lt) = Y · (aη1ftaη2jt )(T − t)η3(1− lt)
A.4 Weight
This section explains the procedure by which we calculated the estimation weights in
section 4:
• First, we created the cells considering individual characteristics: age × gender × coun-
try of residence. The total number of cells was (The Number of Ages from 60 to 64, or
5) × (The Number of Genders, Male or Female, or 2) × (The Number of Countries of
Residence).
• Next, in each cell, we calculated the population based on data from UN World Infor-
mation data. 16 Using this procedure, all respondents were able to be assigned to a
cell number.
• Finally, we constructed the estimation weight for each respondent i with characteristic
k as follows, where B is the set of characteristics and Tk is the number of respondents
in the (merged) dataset (for cross-country analysis) assigned to characteristic k.
Wik =
1
Tk
Pr(Cell Number = k)∑
l∈B Pr(Cell Number = l)
(9)
16http://data.un.org/.
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A.5 Results from Other Countries
In this section, we show the results from our analysis of other countries, estimated in
various groups: Social attendance+ (the respondent increases social activity after retirement)
and Social attendance- (not Social attendance+), PNR:Yes (the respondent has a spouse at
the first response) and PNR:No (not PNR:Yes), BMI ≥ 25 (the BMI of the respondents is
more than 25 at the first response) and BMI < 25 (not BMI ≥ 25), Fat+ (the amount of fat
intake is more than the median at the first response) and Fat- (not Fat+).
Table 28: Heterogeneity in Full Retirement (Word Recall)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US England France Germany Denmark Korea
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.154*** 0.067 0.018 -0.144 -0.200 2.326
(0.027) (0.056) (0.167) (0.201) (0.195) (1.421)
Observations 86773 23923 3998 2365 3497 13437
DWH p-val 0.642 0.305 0.549 0.693 0.224 0.019
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE-IV
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.061*** 0.033 -0.063 -0.090 -0.134 -0.033**
(0.014) (0.030) (0.090) (0.110) (0.105) (0.015)
Observations 86773 23930 4000 2365 3497 14127
DWH p-val 0.602 0.194 0.903 0.482 0.674 0.371
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.093*** 0.034 0.074 -0.054 1.762 1.898*
(0.016) (0.034) (0.101) (0.116) (1.266) (1.132)
Observations 86773 23936 4004 2365 3498 13437
DWH p-val 0.256 0.634 0.436 0.996 0.097 0.014
Model FE FE FE FE FE-IV FE-IV
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), *** (p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , marriage dummy, number of children), economic
variables (household income, house ownership, total wealth), region dummies, year dummies, 1st survey
dummy, and 2nd-4th survey dummy (only HRS).
Table 29: Heterogeneity in Full Retirement (Word Recall)
(1) (2) (3)
US Korea Japan
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.279** -0.122*** -0.072
(0.127) (0.032) (0.064)
Observations 86773 14129 3791
DWH p-val 0.049 0.518 0.561
Model FE-IV FE FE
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.001
(0.002)
Observations 86773
DWH p-val 0.121
Model FE
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), ***
(p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , mar-
riage dummy, number of children), economic variables (house-
hold income, house ownership, total wealth), region dummies,
year dummies, 1st survey dummy, and 2nd-4th survey dummy
(only HRS).
Table 30: Heterogeneity in Retirement by Gender (Word Recall)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US England France Germany Denmark Korea
Panel A: Male
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.137*** -0.015 -0.214 1.227 -0.346 -0.130***
(0.040) (0.076) (0.230) (1.021) (0.233) (0.043)
Observations 38848 13032 1949 1205 1920 8149
DWH p-val 0.179 0.347 0.961 0.069 0.393 0.436
Model FE FE FE FE-IV FE FE
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.058*** 0.002 -0.231* 0.550 -0.169 -0.052**
(0.020) (0.041) (0.123) (0.535) (0.131) (0.022)
Observations 38848 13035 1951 1205 1920 8149
DWH p-val 0.306 0.982 0.498 0.078 0.495 0.656
Model FE FE FE FE-IV FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.081*** -0.017 0.023 -0.150 1.737 -0.079**
(0.024) (0.047) (0.141) (0.159) (1.111) (0.032)
Observations 38848 13041 1953 1205 1921 8149
DWH p-val 0.175 0.124 0.645 0.128 0.049 0.477
Model FE FE FE FE FE-IV FE
Panel B: Female
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.164*** 0.081 0.153 0.119 0.059 -0.069*
(0.036) (0.070) (0.205) (0.228) (0.244) (0.041)
Observations 47925 13283 2206 1365 1816 5978
DWH p-val 0.134 0.121 0.883 0.907 0.938 0.956
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.064*** 0.018 -0.004 0.040 -0.024 -0.015
(0.018) (0.039) (0.108) (0.124) (0.131) (0.021)
Observations 47925 13288 2206 1366 1816 5978
DWH p-val 0.948 0.113 0.640 0.706 0.759 0.125
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired 0.451* 0.063 0.140 0.074 0.083 -0.054*
(0.252) (0.042) (0.125) (0.135) (0.138) (0.031)
Observations 47925 13288 2208 1365 1816 5978
DWH p-val 0.023 0.276 0.536 0.540 0.914 0.302
Model FE-IV FE FE FE FE FE
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), *** (p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , marriage dummy, number of children), economic
variables (household income, house ownership, total wealth), region dummies, year dummies, 1st survey
dummy, and 2nd-4th survey dummy (only HRS).
3 The green character indicates that the IVs do not work well in the 1st stage regression.
Table 31: Heterogeneity in Retirement by Gender (Numeracy)
(1) (2) (3)
US Korea Japan
Panel A: Male
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.008 -0.133*** -0.177*
(0.016) (0.046) (0.091)
Observations 38848 8151 2149
DWH p-val 0.937 0.154 0.548
Model FE FE FE
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.002
(0.003)
Observations 38848
DWH p-val 0.167
Model FE
Panel B: Female
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.415** -0.101** 0.030
(0.183) (0.046) (0.091)
Observations 47925 5978 1642
DWH p-val 0.040 0.577 0.778
Model FE-IV FE FE
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.001
(0.003)
Observations 47925
DWH p-val 0.552
Model FE
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), ***
(p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , mar-
riage dummy, number of children), economic variables (house-
hold income, house ownership, total wealth), region dummies,
year dummies, 1st survey dummy, and 2nd-4th survey dummy
(only HRS).
3 The green character indicates that the IVs do not work well in
the 1st stage regression.
Table 32: Heterogeneity in Retirement by Education (Word Recall)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US England France Germany Denmark Korea
Panel A: Low education
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.149*** 0.064 0.041 -0.068 0.061 2.792
(0.030) (0.062) (0.195) (0.195) (0.219) (1.925)
Observations 65323 17761 2603 1682 1870 12120
DWH p-val 0.397 0.125 0.919 0.897 0.306 0.024
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE-IV
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.053*** 0.399** -0.071 -0.111 0.052 -0.035**
(0.015) (0.169) (0.101) (0.106) (0.120) (0.016)
Observations 65323 17765 2603 1683 1870 12683
DWH p-val 0.852 0.022 0.791 0.809 0.709 0.574
Model FE FE-IV FE FE FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.098*** 0.042 0.108 0.038 1.253* 2.466
(0.019) (0.037) (0.120) (0.117) (0.694) (1.609)
Observations 65323 17771 2606 1682 1871 12120
DWH p-val 0.236 0.684 0.919 0.943 0.058 0.010
Model FE FE FE FE FE-IV FE-IV
Panel B: High education
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.158*** -0.003 -0.032 -0.216 -0.401 -0.061
(0.058) (0.116) (0.284) (0.379) (0.253) (0.091)
Observations 21433 5443 1262 882 1858 1439
DWH p-val 0.425 0.167 0.861 0.166 0.693 0.964
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.088*** 0.025 -0.174 -0.064 -0.300** -0.036
(0.030) (0.064) (0.150) (0.197) (0.136) (0.042)
Observations 21433 5446 1264 882 1858 1439
DWH p-val 0.131 0.118 0.753 0.489 0.483 0.486
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.070** -0.025 0.138 1.064 -0.101 -0.025
(0.035) (0.069) (0.175) (0.748) (0.155) (0.073)
Observations 21433 5446 1265 882 1858 1439
DWH p-val 0.931 0.400 0.998 0.091 0.892 0.702
Model FE FE FE FE-IV FE FE
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), *** (p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , marriage dummy, number of children), economic
variables (household income, house ownership, total wealth), region dummies, year dummies, 1st survey dummy,
and 2nd-4th survey dummy (only HRS).
3 The green character indicates that the IVs do not work well in the 1st stage regression.
Table 33: Heterogeneity in Retirement by Education (Numeracy)
(1) (2) (3)
US Korea Japan
Panel A: Low education
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.321** -0.134*** -0.082
(0.141) (0.035) (0.069)
Observations 65323 12685 3221
DWH p-val 0.035 0.549 0.597
Model FE-IV FE FE
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.001
(0.002)
Observations 65323
DWH p-val 0.505
Model FE
Panel B: High education
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.039* 0.002 0.023
(0.022) (0.076) (0.188)
Observations 21433 1439 558
DWH p-val 0.761 0.507 0.487
Model FE FE FE
Backward counting
Completely retired 0.121**
(0.055)
Observations 21433
DWH p-val 0.019
Model FE-IV
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), ***
(p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , marriage
dummy, number of children), economic variables (household income,
house ownership, total wealth), region dummies, year dummies, 1st
survey dummy, and 2nd-4th survey dummy (only HRS).
3 The green character indicates that the IVs do not work well in the
1st stage regression.
Table 34: Heterogeneity in Retirement by Occupation (Word Recall)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US England France Germany Denmark Korea
Panel A: Blue collar
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.083 0.814** -0.721* -1.046** -0.565 -0.134***
(0.055) (0.355) (0.404) (0.484) (0.373) (0.038)
Observations 19404 12907 915 580 696 8542
DWH p-val 0.340 0.037 0.861 0.523 0.572 0.176
Model FE FE-IV FE FE FE FE
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.054* 0.584*** -0.595*** -0.622** -0.288 -0.046**
(0.028) (0.197) (0.229) (0.248) (0.209) (0.020)
Observations 19404 12910 915 581 696 8542
DWH p-val 0.530 0.003 0.652 0.782 0.618 0.510
Model FE FE-IV FE FE FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.029 0.064 -0.088 -0.438 -0.275 -0.088***
(0.033) (0.044) (0.230) (0.290) (0.211) (0.029)
Observations 19404 12914 916 580 697 8542
DWH p-val 0.314 0.455 0.447 0.468 0.185 0.194
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Panel B: White collar
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.169*** 0.007 0.181 -0.177 0.059 -0.049
(0.034) (0.074) (0.240) (0.262) (0.246) (0.050)
Observations 53512 13316 2570 1520 2785 4794
DWH p-val 0.301 0.614 0.404 0.745 0.566 0.917
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.405** 0.012 0.055 -0.094 -0.024 -0.013
(0.203) (0.041) (0.124) (0.135) (0.130) (0.023)
Observations 53512 13321 2572 1520 2785 4794
DWH p-val 0.097 0.550 0.379 0.772 0.225 0.300
Model FE-IV FE FE FE FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.104*** -0.003 0.127 -0.083 0.083 -0.036
(0.021) (0.044) (0.150) (0.156) (0.140) (0.041)
Observations 53512 13323 2572 1520 2785 4794
DWH p-val 0.715 0.763 0.565 0.793 0.965 0.443
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), *** (p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , marriage dummy, number of children), economic
variables (household income, house ownership, total wealth), region dummies, year dummies, 1st survey
dummy, and 2nd-4th survey dummy (only HRS).
3 The green character indicates that the IVs do not work well in the 1st stage regression.
Table 35: Heterogeneity in Retirement by Occupation (Numaracy)
(1) (2) (3)
US Korea Japan
Panel A: Blue collar
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.048** -0.115*** -0.270**
(0.024) (0.044) (0.106)
Observations 19404 8544 1383
DWH p-val 0.674 0.543 0.292
Model FE FE FE
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.003
(0.005)
Observations 19404
DWH p-val 0.675
Model FE
Panel B: White collar
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.338** -0.086* 0.032
(0.168) (0.049) (0.086)
Observations 53512 4794 2177
DWH p-val 0.058 0.333 0.452
Model FE-IV FE FE
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.000
(0.002)
Observations 53512
DWH p-val 0.262
Model FE
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), ***
(p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , mar-
riage dummy, number of children), economic variables (household
income, house ownership, total wealth), region dummies, year
dummies, 1st survey dummy, and 2nd-4th survey dummy (only
HRS).
3 The green character indicates that the IVs do not work well in the
1st stage regression.
Table 36: Heterogeneity in Retirement by Leisure Activities 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US England France Germany Denmark Korea
Panel A: Social activity increases
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.165 -2.528** 0.805 0.474 -0.073 0.372**
(0.110) (1.185) (0.721) (0.523) (0.787) (0.155)
Observations 4523 1833 261 192 166 384
DWH p-val 0.978 0.029 0.072 0.419 0.496 0.205
Model FE FE-IV FE FE FE FE
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.046 -1.120* 0.258 -0.544 -0.342 0.207***
(0.058) (0.645) (0.389) (0.335) (0.362) (0.071)
Observations 4523 1833 261 192 166 384
DWH p-val 0.257 0.084 0.176 0.569 0.559 0.020
Model FE FE-IV FE FE FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.119* -1.428** 0.548 1.018*** 0.269 0.165
(0.066) (0.713) (0.395) (0.321) (0.487) (0.121)
Observations 4523 1834 261 192 166 384
DWH p-val 0.362 0.042 0.038 0.425 0.573 0.590
Model FE FE-IV FE FE FE FE
Panel B: Social activity decreases
WR summary score
Completely retired 0.030 0.011 -0.675** -0.336 -0.476* -0.015
(0.120) (0.096) (0.261) (0.328) (0.282) (0.055)
Observations 4384 6488 918 670 879 3089
DWH p-val 0.193 0.443 0.538 0.666 0.598 0.187
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Immediate WR
Completely retired 0.058 0.041 -0.424*** 0.002 -0.243 -0.040
(0.061) (0.055) (0.149) (0.177) (0.150) (0.030)
Observations 4384 6488 918 671 879 3089
DWH p-val 0.134 0.413 0.886 0.974 0.340 0.182
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.013 -0.032 -0.260 -0.339* -0.236 0.025
(0.068) (0.058) (0.163) (0.190) (0.170) (0.040)
Observations 4384 6489 920 670 880 3089
DWH p-val 0.453 0.594 0.378 0.525 0.981 0.392
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), *** (p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , marriage dummy, number of children), economic variables
(household income, house ownership, total wealth), region dummies, year dummies, 1st survey dummy, and 2nd-4th
survey dummy (only HRS).
3 The green character indicates that the IVs do not work well in the 1st stage regression.
Table 37: Heterogeneity in Retirement by Leisure Activities 2
(1) (2) (3)
US Korea Japan
Panel A: Social activity increases
Serial 7s
Completely retired 0.012 0.327 0.430
(0.047) (0.214) (0.283)
Observations 4523 384 172
DWH p-val 0.901 0.302 0.782
Model FE FE FE
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.016*
(0.008)
Observations 4523
DWH p-val 0.200
Model FE
Panel B: Social activity decreases
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.028 -0.134** -0.150
(0.053) (0.057) (0.134)
Observations 4384 3090 774
DWH p-val 0.520 0.833 0.440
Model FE FE FE
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.003
(0.010)
Observations 4384
DWH p-val 0.414
Model FE
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), *** (p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , marriage dummy,
number of children), economic variables (household income, house ownership,
total wealth), region dummies, year dummies, 1st survey dummy, and 2nd-4th
survey dummy (only HRS).
3 The green character indicates that the IVs do not work well in the 1st stage
regression.
Table 38: Heterogeneity in Retirement by Having a Partner 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US England France Germany Denmark Korea
Panel A: Not having spouse
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.217*** -0.033 -0.022 -0.180 -0.207 -0.100
(0.059) (0.118) (0.288) (0.520) (0.342) (0.081)
Observations 20053 5020 1064 390 730 1727
DWH p-val 0.912 0.577 0.354 0.562 0.070 0.688
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.103*** -0.028 -0.079 -0.088 -0.158 -0.062
(0.029) (0.063) (0.154) (0.263) (0.187) (0.044)
Observations 20053 5023 1064 390 730 1727
DWH p-val 0.407 0.309 0.137 0.656 0.895 0.325
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.113*** -0.018 0.057 -0.092 -0.049 -0.038
(0.036) (0.074) (0.189) (0.304) (0.202) (0.061)
Observations 20053 5024 1064 390 730 1727
DWH p-val 0.630 0.920 0.894 0.760 0.004 0.261
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Panel B: Having spouse
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.134*** 0.064 0.031 -0.083 -0.112 2.659*
(0.030) (0.057) (0.180) (0.185) (0.197) (1.582)
Observations 66720 21295 3091 2180 3006 11803
DWH p-val 0.492 0.344 0.423 0.291 0.389 0.011
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE-IV
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.049*** 0.024 -0.093 -0.099 -0.075 -0.030*
(0.015) (0.032) (0.095) (0.100) (0.108) (0.016)
Observations 66720 21300 3093 2181 3006 12400
DWH p-val 0.884 0.216 0.167 0.465 0.219 0.164
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.087*** 0.040 0.116 0.012 -0.040 1.936
(0.018) (0.034) (0.107) (0.109) (0.113) (1.191)
Observations 66720 21305 3097 2180 3007 11803
DWH p-val 0.240 0.666 0.928 0.242 0.755 0.016
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE-IV
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), *** (p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , marriage dummy, number of children), economic vari-
ables (household income, house ownership, total wealth), region dummies, year dummies, 1st survey dummy, and
2nd-4th survey dummy (only HRS).
3 The green character indicates that the IVs do not work well in the 1st stage regression.
Table 39: Heterogeneity in Retirement by Having a Partner 2
(1) (2) (3)
US Korea Japan
Panel A: Not having spouse
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.050** -0.166* -0.036
(0.025) (0.085) (0.140)
Observations 20053 1727 777
DWH p-val 0.115 0.126 0.935
Model FE FE FE
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.002
(0.005)
Observations 20053
DWH p-val 0.992
Model FE
Panel B: Having spouse
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.023* -0.113*** -0.074
(0.013) (0.035) (0.072)
Observations 66720 12402 3014
DWH p-val 0.155 0.260 0.715
Model FE FE FE
Backward counting
Completely retired 0.050**
(0.024)
Observations 66720
DWH p-val 0.031
Model FE-IV
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), *** (p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , marriage
dummy, number of children), economic variables (household income,
house ownership, total wealth), region dummies, year dummies, 1st sur-
vey dummy, and 2nd-4th survey dummy (only HRS).
3 The green character indicates that the IVs do not work well in the 1st
stage regression.
Table 40: Heterogeneity in Retirement by BMI 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US England France Germany Denmark Korea
Panel A: BMI < 25
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.066 0.039 0.105 -0.063 -0.243 2.620
(0.049) (0.119) (0.250) (0.280) (0.253) (1.619)
Observations 26866 4901 2015 1024 1672 10121
DWH p-val 0.769 0.115 0.427 0.354 0.348 0.015
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE-IV
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.025 0.058 -0.080 -0.023 -0.127 1.171
(0.024) (0.065) (0.129) (0.152) (0.129) (0.762)
Observations 26866 4902 2017 1024 1672 10121
DWH p-val 0.283 0.351 0.584 0.519 0.952 0.032
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE-IV
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.044 -0.724* 0.161 -0.041 -0.117 1.449
(0.030) (0.430) (0.149) (0.162) (0.154) (1.088)
Observations 26866 4903 2020 1024 1672 10121
DWH p-val 0.173 0.088 0.400 0.373 0.134 0.077
Model FE FE-IV FE FE FE FE-IV
Panel B: BMI ≥ 25
WR summary score
Completely retired -0.191*** -0.031 -0.095 -0.155 -0.057 -0.157***
(0.033) (0.075) (0.191) (0.229) (0.230) (0.054)
Observations 59286 12740 2118 1537 2042 3392
DWH p-val 0.724 0.134 0.675 0.530 0.563 0.220
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Immediate WR
Completely retired -0.076*** -0.031 -0.126 -0.145 -0.073 -0.074**
(0.016) (0.041) (0.104) (0.122) (0.133) (0.030)
Observations 59286 12741 2118 1538 2042 3392
DWH p-val 0.975 0.143 0.869 0.571 0.117 0.310
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
Delayed WR
Completely retired -0.115*** 0.000 0.031 -0.014 0.013 -0.083**
(0.020) (0.046) (0.118) (0.136) (0.127) (0.041)
Observations 59286 12746 2118 1537 2043 3392
DWH p-val 0.619 0.272 0.666 0.564 0.693 0.028
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), *** (p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , marriage dummy, number of children), economic
variables (household income, house ownership, total wealth), region dummies, year dummies, 1st survey
dummy, and 2nd-4th survey dummy (only HRS).
3 The green character indicates that the IVs do not work well in the 1st stage regression.
Table 41: Heterogeneity in Retirement by BMI 2
(1) (2) (3)
US Korea Japan
Panel A: BMI < 25
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.034 -0.119*** -0.033
(0.021) (0.037) (0.078)
Observations 26866 10661 2796
DWH p-val 0.156 0.468 0.785
Model FE FE FE
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.004
(0.004)
Observations 26866
DWH p-val 0.158
Model FE
Panel B: BMI ≥ 25
Serial 7s
Completely retired -0.026* -0.116* -0.181
(0.014) (0.068) (0.110)
Observations 59286 3393 975
DWH p-val 0.304 0.508 0.982
Model FE FE FE
Backward counting
Completely retired -0.000
(0.003)
Observations 59286
DWH p-val 0.322
Model FE
1 Standard errors in parentheses and * (p < .1), ** (p < .05), ***
(p < .01).
2 All specifications include demographic variables (age, age , mar-
riage dummy, number of children), economic variables (house-
hold income, house ownership, total wealth), region dummies,
year dummies, 1st survey dummy, and 2nd-4th survey dummy
(only HRS).
3 The green character indicates that the IVs do not work well in
the 1st stage regression.
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